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How the Greek Press Constructed the “Greek Economic Crisis”

A Thesis

Presented to
the Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by

Maria Elena Kuntz

June 2016

Advisor: Nadezhda Kaneva, Ph.D.

Author: Maria Elena Kuntz

Title: How the Greek Press Constructed the “Greek Economic Crisis”

Advisor: Nadezhda Kaneva, Ph.D.

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Abstract

Since 2008, there has been a surge of interest in and research on the relationship between news media and economic reporting, particularly as it concerns financial crises. The 2008 U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, quickly followed by the economic crisis that began to unfold in Greece in 2009, spurred researchers to examine how newspapers around the world report on the complex, globalized economy. In the pursuit of understanding transnational economic processes, publics rely on news media to provide information about the meaning of economic events, especially crises. As such, newspapers are key players in constructing the narratives of crises.

This study explores how the “Greek economic crisis” was framed in Greek newspapers, as opposed to foreign, non-Greek newspapers. The dialectical process through which knowledge about the financial crisis is constructed is examined. Previous research has identified common journalistic frames in the coverage the Greek economic crisis by national newspapers from Western Europe, the Americas, and Asia. These frames emphasize cultural and social explanations for the crisis yet do little to analyze the underlying economic and political causes. Furthermore, these researchers did not examine Greek newspaper coverage of the crisis.

The impact on knowledge construction that results from the tendency of researchers and the media to emphasize the press of politically powerful nations, rather than less powerful states, like Greece, is discussed. Using critical theory and frame

analysis, the study examines how two Greek newspapers, *Eleftherotypia* and *Kathimerini*, described and framed the crisis in ways both similar and different from each other, and, yet, quite different from the ways in which foreign newspapers framed the “Greek economic crisis.”

Key Words: *Framing, Crisis, Greece, Economic Crisis, International Media, Social Constructionism, Greek Economic Crisis, Euro-Zone Crisis, Euro-Crisis, Newspapers*

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Chapter One: Introduction

Since 2008 there has been a surge of interest in and research on the relationship between news media and economic reporting, particularly as they concern financial crises (Lee, 2014; Papathanassopoulos, 2014). Beginning with the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis and followed by the economic crisis spurred by Greece's debt, it seems that international publics are increasingly interested in and concerned about the complex globalized economy. In the pursuit of understanding transnational economic processes, publics rely upon news media to provide knowledge and information about the meaning and implications of economic events and especially crises. As such, news media are key players in constructing the narratives of crises, so much so that they may even be creating crises where none exist (Juko, 2010). In this thesis I examine the role of the media in framing and constructing what has become known as the "Greek economic crisis." Specifically, I will compare the framing of this crisis in Greek newspapers to the ways in which the same events were framed in foreign newspapers.

Naming the Crisis

The cluster of events that I will study in this thesis has been referred to by many names over the course of the past five years. Some of the terms used to describe the events include: the "Greek Crisis" (Tzogopoulos, 2013; Mylonas & Kompatsiaris, 2013; Antoniadis, 2013; Lapavistas, 2010; Juko, 2010; Zizek, 2012; Knight, 2012; Koniordos, 2011; Tsarouhas, 2012), the "Greek debt crisis" (Tracy, 2012; Bhanot, Burns, Hunter &

Williams, 2012; Ardagna & Caselli, 2014), the “Greek economic crisis” (Knight, 2013) the “Global Financial Crisis” (Pagoulatos & Triantopoulos, 2009), the “Euro-Zone Crisis” (Fischer, Neaman, & Sharma, 2011), the “Eurozone crisis” (Zizek, 2010), the “Economic Crisis of the EU” (Mylonas, 2012), the “legitimation crisis” (Douzinas, 2010), the “Economic Crisis” (Talalay, 2013), the “EU Financial Crisis” (Hepp, Lingenberg, Elsler, Möller, Mollen & Offerhaus, 2013) and, finally, the “Euro Crisis” (Rosenthal, 2012)¹. From this list it is clear that the meaning, scope, and implications of the events remain contested. Scholars do not agree on whether these events were a Greek national issue, a European or regional issue, or a global and transnational issue. Nor do they agree on whether the scope of the events was limited to debt, or whether it should be discussed more broadly in terms of finances or economics. Nevertheless, all authors appear to agree that the events in question represented a “crisis.”

In order to write about these events it is helpful to adopt a consistent naming convention for the sake of clarity and parsimony. Choosing a name, however, is in itself a way of framing the events and creating meaning with intended and unintended implications. For the purposes of this study, I will refer to the events as the “Greek economic crisis” or simply as the “crisis”. As will be discussed later, throughout the literature there is a struggle to determine the cause of the Greek economic crisis and to assign fault to individuals (Zizek, 2010 and 2012; Douzinas, 2010), institutions (Tracy, 2012; Juko, 2010), or national culture (Mylonas, 2012; Antoniadis, 2013; Tzogopoulos, 2013). In light of this, choosing to refer to the events as the “Greek economic crisis”

¹ The punctuation and capitalization of these terms varied from scholar to scholar and are included here as they were written in the original texts. This variation underscores the contested naming convention for and meaning of these events.

raises a risk that readers may conclude that I am assigning blame or responsibility for the crisis to Greece. It should be clear that this is by no means my intention. Rather, I chose this term because the events I want to analyze are largely recognized as having to do with Greece, that is, occurring in Greece and involving the Greek people. As Greece is surely central to this discussion, I have chosen to include it in my naming convention.

Furthermore, I am including the word “economic” in my naming convention to emphasize the economic and financial issues that belie the crisis, and to distinguish these events from other political events, such as public protests and riots that followed the quickly changing economic policies and austerity measures that were implemented in Greece. While my naming convention, the “Greek economic crisis” remains problematic, I will use it throughout this study to refer to the events that unfolded in Greece and the European Union (EU) from October 2009 through March 2012 (see Appendix A).

Historical Context of the Crisis

A body of literature from various disciplines including sociology, communication, cultural studies, anthropology, economics, business, political science, international relations, and comparative politics seeks to understand how Greece's economy began to unravel and what may be the ongoing effects of the crisis. Two common questions are woven throughout the literature: First, how did the Crisis happen? Second, who or what was to blame? While there is no single answer to those questions, I have identified three main themes which emerge from these studies as they strive to address these questions:

1. Political and economic issues and neoliberal policies contributed to the Greek economic crisis (Tsarouhas, 2012; Knight, 2012; Rosenthal, 2012; Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou & Exadaktylos, 2013).

2. Unfair and inaccurate international and foreign newspaper of the Greek economic crisis coverage disregarded the Greek perspective and exacerbated the crisis (Tzogopoulos, 2013; Juko, 2010; Tracy, 2012; Bhanot, Burns, Hunter & Williams, 2012; Antoniadis, 2013).
3. European leaders used Greece as a scapegoat for the EU's economic troubles and this was echoed in foreign newspaper coverage of events (Tsarouhas, 2012; Talalay, 2013; Mylonas, 2012).

To put the events of the Greek economic crisis in some historical context I discuss each of these three themes in more detail below.

Political and economic issues and neoliberal policies contributed to the Greek economic crisis

The political economy of the European Union and its neoliberal financial policies were found to be complicating factors that exacerbated or caused the Greek economic crisis (Tsarouhas, 2012; Knight, 2012; Rosenthal, 2012). Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou, and Exadaktylos (2013) wrote that the failure of global capitalism has created imbalances which, when combined with inherent weaknesses in the Eurozone design and a lack of contingency for unforeseen problems, led to the Greek economic crisis (p. 3). Looking at political factors, Tsarouhas (2012) notes that the crisis is truly political in nature and the two-fold consequence of Greek politicians running up high debt to finance their policies, while the EU becoming reliant on budget cuts and austerity measures to resolve the crisis, the latter of which has not proven effective.

A number of authors (Juko, 2010; Mylonas, 2012; Antoniadis, 2013; Tzogopoulos, 2013; Tracy, 2012) found that upon examination of financial data, Greece seems to have faced harsher consequences than other countries who also failed to comply with Eurozone standards. Upon close investigation, statistics from various EU reporting agencies indicate that Greece was not financially the weakest EU member state. As Juko (2010) found, 2009 and 2010 fundamental economic factors in Greece did not indicate that Greece's credit trustworthiness should have declined as rapidly as it did. According to 2012 OECD reports (Mylonas, 2012), the average "lazy" Greek worked 650 hours more that year than German workers, and public sector employment in Greece accounted for only 8% of jobs, compared to 22% in France and 28% in Denmark. Furthermore, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Italy all had higher debt to GDP ratios than Greece (Tracy, 2012). Rosenthal (2012), responding to explicit nation blaming in many newspapers in "Europe's 'virtuous north...and also in the U.S'" (p. 53), asserted that the Euro, not Greek national character, caused the crisis (p. 55). Despite these facts, Greece became the focal point of the crisis. Tracy (2012) and Tzogopoulos (2013) suggested that Greece was an easy target, part of a larger plan to test the power of neoliberal policies and private investors. Knight (2012, 2013), Ardagna & Caselli (2014), and Zizek (2010, 2012) theorized that Greece may have been used as a guinea pig to test the enforcement of EU economic policies that a number of countries were violating.

2. Unfair and inaccurate news media coverage disregarded the Greek perspective and exacerbated the crisis

Tzogopoulos (2013) argued that Greece's distinctive culture, which is a hybrid of Western European and Eastern cultures (Papathanassopoulos, 2014; Triandafyllidou & Gropas, 2009; Tsouklas, 1999), is misunderstood by international leaders and journalists alike. The crisis has been particularly challenging for journalists to cover and for the international community to follow and understand. It is not merely a financial issue, but also one that is enmeshed in politics, culture, social movements and issues. Tzogopoulos (2013), who examined media frames used by European, North American, and Asian newspapers to situate the crisis, suggested that more attention should have been paid to Greek culture. For example international journalists ought to have worked with Greek journalists to garner cultural insights, or, at the very least, Tzogopoulos (2013) suggested that they could have used Internet translation software to follow the Greek press as a way to inform their own reporting (p. 144).

Tzogopoulos, who is a Greek, as well as a journalist and an academic educated in the West, was quite critical of Greece's role in the crisis. However, he did raise the concern that the Greek perspective was missing from the foreign coverage of the events. Similarly, Knight (2012) noted that even while suicides in Greece were rising drastically, the *New York Times* coverage of the crisis was focused on fiscal accountability, financial issues such as excessive and poorly designed loans, and neoliberal policies. At the same time, Greek culture was vilified in foreign coverage of the crisis (Mylonas, 2012; Antoniadis, 2013; Juko, 2010; Tracy, 2012).

Some scholars (Tracy, 2012; Juko, 2010) argued that news media fueled the idea of a Greek economic crisis with coverage that was dominated by fear, sensationalized reporting, and episodic framing. These authors question if a financial or economic crisis

actually existed and if it did, how widespread it truly was. In order for a crisis to have occurred, the changes in the market conditions and bond values would have had to reach a particular threshold, which, according to some, was not met at the onset of the crisis in 2009 (Juko, 2010; Bhanot , Burns, Hunter & Williams, 2012). Juko (2010) and Bhanot et al. (2012) claim that statistically a crisis status was not really warranted, and that, instead, a combination of negative, sensationalist news and reactive choices by the ratings agencies led to the lowering of Greece's credit and bond ratings which in turn fueled actual crisis conditions that may have been avoided.

Fears about international monetary security led the ratings agencies to downgrade Greece's international creditworthiness and increase its investment risk. Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) stated that news from ratings and international agencies influences markets more strongly than political news. Extending this finding to the Greek economic crisis, it follows that the credit agencies' decisions to downgrade Greece's rating, which appear to have been fear driven (Juko, 2010; Bhanot et al., 2012), may have transformed an international financial concern into a crisis. Finally, Juko (2010) explored the relationship between economic and financial news reporters from "news agencies, newspapers, magazines and other written media, including web-based publications" (p. 34) and their sources within financial industries and agencies. She found that "the reliance on market experts... can jeopardize the objectiveness of media reporting" (p. 33). Referencing Sigal (1987), Juko (2010) reiterated that in the case of the Greek economic crisis it "is not what happens, but what someone says has happened or will happen" (p. 33) that appears to have been more influential. With this, Juko underscored her central concern that the media made the Greek economic crisis "worse" (2010, p.28).

3. Greece as a scapegoat for EU economic troubles

In many ways, Greece, situated in the far Southeast corner of Europe, is in Europe but not quite European (Triandafyllidou & Gropas, 2009). It is neither a “Third World” country nor fully developed (Papathanassopoulos, 2014, p. 107). Knight (2013) asserted that as a result, Greece is an easy periphery target used to distract publics in the European North from budget cuts. A focus on Greece allows the vast European public to overlook larger economies, such as Spain and Italy, which are facing similar issues (p. 148). As an “other” within the EU, Greece has been readily blamed by many for the EU’s financial crisis, which, as I discussed previously, has been conceived as Greek, European, or global.

Talalay (2013), who examined European political cartoons, found that political cartoons were used to blame Greece, to mock it for not living up to its glorious past, and to question its place in the EU (Talalay, 2013). Knight (2012) and Tsarouhas (2012) raised concerns that journalism which promotes stereotypes, in addition to the expansion of austerity politics, stands to strengthen an “Us vs. Them” mentality in Greece that will strengthen Greek animosity towards European centers of power and vice versa. Knight (2013) was similarly concerned that the culture of blame arising out of the crisis facilitated an “erasing and remaking of the world in the mold of neoliberalism” (p. 148). In other words, it is easier to blame a crisis on culture than to critique neoliberal ideology, which informs many international economic policies. Furthermore, Antoniadis (2013) concluded that over time Greece transitioned from being an object of critique to a “negative reference point”, indicating that the overwhelmingly negative news about Greeks and the Greek economic crisis began to operate at a subliminal level (p. 21). By

attempting to explain how the Greek economic crisis occurred, and thereby blaming Greece, the European media were shaping public thought about transnational economics (Papathanassopoulos, 2014).

Chapter Two: Explication of the Problem

As the preceding discussion suggests, news media played an important role in what has become known as the Greek economic crisis. Papathanassopoulos (2014) noted that “the news media play a critical role in covering and commenting on social and political crises” (pp. 104) and thus they contribute to constructing, or making sense of, these crises for audiences. As I will discuss in the literature review section, foreign newspapers by and large framed the Greek economic crisis negatively through their reporting and coverage (Mylonas, 2012; Juko, 2010; Antoniadis, 2013; Tracy, 2012; Tzogopoulos, 2013). In doing so, they contributed to a public discourse that tried to explain and make sense of recent history and international economics.

Papathanassopoulos (2014) also pointed out that media coverage of the economy is important because it influences the public agenda, public attitudes toward the economy, and consumer behaviors in the financial markets (p.104). Additionally, he asserted that individuals rely on the media as “their primary source of information” particularly when news relates to national or international issues (p. 103).

While news media played a powerful and contested role in constructing knowledge about the Greek economic crisis, the institutions that constitute the media are varied in many ways. While some media sources have large audiences or are written in widely spoken languages, such as English, others are much less powerful. The latter category includes Greek media. Media content produced in Greece, primarily for Greeks,

does not figure prominently into the international media discourse about the Greek economic crisis for a number of reasons. First, Greek media are neither internationally recognized nor easily accessible as the Greek language is not widely used by many in media or politics outside of Greece and Cyprus. Second, Greece is neither politically nor financially powerful (Papathanassopoulos, 2014 p. 107); rather, it is a “peripheral capitalist country where a narrative of ‘catching up’ with Europe is strong” (Triandafyllidou, Gropas & Kouki, 2013, p. 2). Third, Greece is physically remote, situated in the far Southeast corner of Europe, a reality which reduces the international relevance of the Greek perspective on the economic crisis (Adoni & Mane, 1984). As a result, the Greek perspective has been overlooked by academics and remains linguistically inaccessible to most people. In other words, while Greece was at the center of international economic and political events, the Greek media’s ability to participate in the rhetorical construction of the Greek economic crisis was limited. In light of this, the Greek economic crisis can be seen as a site for contested meaning where power language and politics affect the news media and its reporting.

This study aims to address the gap in existing research on how news media played a role in constructing the Greek economic crisis by focusing on the Greek perspective. Specifically, it presents a frame analysis of the coverage of the Greek economic crisis as it was covered in two leading Greek newspapers: *Kathimerini* (*Η Καθημερινή*)² and *Eleftherotypia* (*Ελευθεροτυπία*).³ I hypothesize that these Greek newspapers framed the

² *Η Καθημερινή* (*I Kathimerini*) is commonly referred to as *Καθημερινή* (*Kathimerini*). As such, I will refer to the newspaper simply as *Kathimerini* throughout this text.

³ Additional information about these newspapers will be provided in the methods section.

Greek economic crisis differently than foreign newspapers. Thus the main question that my thesis seeks to answer is: How did Greek newspapers frame the Greek economic crisis?

As I discuss in the literature review, a number of studies have analyzed the framing of the Greek economic crisis. There is research about how the crisis was framed in 34 news sources from twelve countries.⁴ These studies provide detailed information about how the meaning and the cause of the Greek economic crisis were constructed by newspapers outside of Greece, but they all excluded the Greek press. They also illustrate that the meaning of and reason for the events is highly contested. Importantly, the Greek perspective is missing from the discussion about these “historical moments” (Triandafyllidou, Gropas & Kouki, 2014) and their political and economic significance.

The limitations of the existing literature are two-fold. First, despite the breadth of news sources, nations and languages that were included in the existing literature, Greek newspapers were not analyzed. Therefore the dominant frames that have been identified were created by news media sources outside of Greece that are influenced by their own national contexts and interests. Second, what has been said about the Greek economic crisis and its international implications reveals national stereotypes (Mylonas, 2012; Tracy, 2012; Antoniadou, 2013). In actuality this non-Greek discourse is part of an incomplete picture. The Greek contribution to the discourse on the crisis exists, but it

⁴ News sources were as follows, by country: Germany – *Bild*, *Börsen-Zeitung*, *Capital*, *Der Spiegel*, *Die Welt*, *Die Zeit*, *Euro*, *Finance*, *Focus Magazin*, *Focus Money*, *Manager Magazin*, *Platow*, *Spiegel Online*; United States – *ABC News*, *NBC News*, *CBS News*, *Newsweek*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Time*, *USA Today*; United Kingdom – *The Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Times*; France – *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*; Spain – *El Pais*; Italy – *La Repubblica*; China – *China Daily*; Korea – *The Korea Times*; India – *The Times of India*; Japan – *The Daily Yomiuri*; Poland – *Gazeta Wyborcza*; Singapore – *The Straits Times*

was previously unexamined and had yet to be compared to news sources contributing more powerfully to the construction of the Greek economic crisis and its importance as an international and a Greek national event. This is precisely the area in which this study seeks to make a contribution.

Research Questions

This thesis will examine the relationship between economic news and the construction of knowledge about the Greek economic crisis from a Greek perspective, in contrast to the foreign perspectives that have been studied. A set of frames has been identified across studies of international press coverage of the Greek financial crisis. These studies, published in English, have not included Greek newspapers in their data pool. Given the national proximity (Adoni & Mane, 1984) of the Greek press to the crisis, I expected that frames in the Greek press would be different from those used by the foreign press, the latter of which are distanced from many of the social, political, and economic effects of the crisis. At the same time, Greek journalists are not separate from international media. They, too, participate in a global media system. In that sense, they are also influenced by and influencing international discourse about the Greek economic crisis. Nevertheless, their contribution to discourse on the topic has not been included in academic research. This thesis explores the ways in which national newspapers do or do not differ greatly from foreign newspapers when covering economic issues that have both national and international implications.

More specifically, in this study I analyze coverage of the Greek economic crisis in two Greek newspapers: *Kathimerini* (*Η Καθημερινή*) and *Eleftherotypia* (*Ελευθεροτυπία*). Several research questions are proposed:

RQ1: What terms do Greek newspapers use to describe and name the Greek economic crisis?

RQ2: What frames were used by the Greek press to cover the Greek economic crisis and what is their prevalence in the coverage?

RQ3: Given the political nature of Greek newspapers, what similarities and differences exist between *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia*—two newspapers that represent different parts of the political spectrum?

RQ4: How do the frames used by the Greek newspapers compare to those used by foreign newspapers to cover the Greek economic crisis?

As I have discussed, the name of the crisis is itself a construction of the events and an attempt to explain how the crisis occurred and who is to blame. Thus, the first research question examines the way or ways in which Greek newspapers refer to the events associated with the crisis. This exploration is important to understanding how Greek media and society have constructed the crisis within the context of their social, political, and historical experience. The second research question aims to identify the frames that Greek newspapers employed in their representation of the Greek economic crisis as this research does not currently exist. Additionally, it is hypothesized that not all frames will be equally present in the coverage, so identifying the prevalence of each frame will determine if certain frames are more dominant than others in Greek newspapers. As for RQ3, a comparison between the two Greek newspapers, *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia* is informative as many Greek newspapers, including those with the largest circulation and name recognition, retain significant political leanings and followings (Zaharopoulos & Paraschos, 1993; Roberts & Bantimaroudis, 1997). RQ4

addresses the difference in framing used by Greek and foreign newspapers, (wherein Greece had become a “negative reference point” (Antoniades, 2013, p. 21)), and thereby the hypothesis that frames in Greek newspapers would differ from those in foreign newspaper coverage.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework

In a theoretical sense, this thesis aims to understand the interactions between the news media and transnational economic processes. The complexities of modern market economies, which are influenced by governments, private industry, investors, and non-governmental organizations, as well as by representations in the media, can be understood through the lens of social constructionism. From a social constructionist perspective, knowledge about the market economy can be understood as shaped by financial and media organizations and through our experiences of interacting with the discourses and social norms these organizations produce. Within media studies the Greek economic crisis has been studied primarily by scholars who use framing theory in order to make sense of the ways in which newspapers have covered the events associated with the crisis. The main ideas of framing theory are also aligned with social constructionism. In this section I will discuss both of these theoretical traditions and the ways in which they inform my study.

Social Construction of Reality and the Market

According to Baran & Davis (2009), social constructionism posits that individuals have very little power to actively construct or change social institutions and norms. Instead, institutions and social norms inform socialization and human conduct to such an extent that individuals generally conduct life in such a way that reinforces these structures, or else they risk negative and serious social consequences. Further, human

activity and social interaction strengthen social norms, thus creating an “ongoing dialectical process” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 129) that constitutes the creation of social order. Sociologists Berger and Luckmann (1966) described this dialectical process as “composed of three moments of externalization, objectivation and internalization” (p. 129). Externalization of social order is explained as the role institutions and social structure play in everyday life and routines (p. 149), for example standard work hours, politeness standards, and the hierarchy of social class and professions. Objectivation is the process by which individuals participate in the creation of institutions and social order (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 60-61). Individuals may experience life and institutions as objectively “real,” yet, through the lens of objectivation, they are active agents who participate in the creation of institutions and social norms. The third aspect of this continuum is internalization, whereby individuals participate in the perpetuation of the social order because they “cannot evade it or avoid it. [They] can do little to alter it and then only incrementally at the margins” (Storr, 2009, p.3). It is through internalization that objects of reality hold personal meaning as a result of experience (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 61).

While Berger and Luckmann addressed neither mass communication nor the market explicitly in their work, they would surely agree that these institutions are socially constructed and perpetuated. Storr (2009) extended the theory of social construction to the “market” in his essay “The Social Construction of the Market” and argues that the market (and I would add the economy) is: “(i) a phenomenon that is brought about by the social actions of individuals and (ii) a phenomenon that individuals come to know through their socialization into a particular community and their personal experiences

with buying and selling goods and services” (p.3). The market *economy* exists therefore, as both “objective and subjective reality” (Storr, 2009, p.3); an objective reality whose rules govern our daily interaction and a subjective reality that individuals co-construct through choices and experiences.

Framing Theory

Framing theory was developed by social psychologist Erving Goffman who agreed with social constructionists that institutions were very powerful in relation to constructing reality (Baran & Davis 2009). However, Goffman maintained that individuals had some agency in that they had the power to decide whether or not to “play the game” dictated by social standards (Baran & Davis 2009, p. 314). Moreover, he argued that individuals have at their disposal a variety of frames, ranging from serious to playful and any tenor in between, which they can use to adjust to changing expectations as well as unexpected events (Baran & Davis, 2009, p. 314-317).

In media and journalism studies, framing theory has been used to challenge the idea that news stories can or should be objective. As Baran and Davis (2009) noted, powerful institutions behind media outlets can “promote frames that serve to reinforce or consolidate an existing social order and to marginalize frames that raise questions about or challenge the way things are” (2009, p. 320). Iyengar (2010) added that the “prevailing frames in elite rhetoric and news media coverage shape mass opinion” (p. 185). In that sense, multiple social constructions, originating in institutions with differing agendas, exist simultaneously. Thus, from this theoretical perspective, the role of journalists and reporting is not to be objective, but rather to ensure that information is “routinely presented and debated” (Baran & Davis, 2009, p. 320).

As I will discuss in more detail in the literature review section, framing theory has been employed by a number of researchers to examine international media coverage of the Greek economic crisis. It has also been used widely in political science and communication to study political communication, news discourses, and the reporting of international events (e.g., Entman, 1991; Scheufele, 1999; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Bantimaroudis and Kampanellou (2007) referenced Entman (1993) when they wrote, “scholars agree that framing constitutes a form of bias – a process of selection and exclusion” (p. 82). By selecting certain words or phrases, news items, and interviewees, journalists begin to give shape to the information they are presenting. Given the limitations of time and space, a single article requires structure. In order to efficiently handle a wealth of information, journalists emphasize specific aspects of reality (Scheufele, 2004, p. 402) and in doing so create frames that structure the meaning of events for audiences. Frames make sense of information. Reese (2001) related that, to do so, frames must be:

1. *Organizing*: Framing varies in how successfully, comprehensively or completely it organizes information.
2. *Principled*: The frame is based on an abstract principle and is not the same as the texts through which it manifests itself.
3. *Shared*: The frame must be shared on some level for it to be significant and communicable.
4. *Persistent*: The significance of frames lies in their durability, their persistence and routine over time.
5. *Symbolic*: The frame is revealed in symbolic forms of expression.
6. *Structured*: Frames organize by providing identifiable patterns of structures, which can vary in their complexity. (Reese, 2001, p. 11-12)

These aspects, as defined by Reese, underscore the concept that frames are not made by a single entity; rather frames are social constructions, externalized by institutions and internalized by individuals (Storr, 2009). However, a frame represents only one lens through which complex information can be analyzed and understood. In specific attempts to make meaning through newspaper coverage of international events two types of frames are particularly relevant: *media frames* and *individual frames*.

Media Frames

Media frames or “*frames in communication* ... refer to the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles that a speaker (e.g. a politician, a media outlet) uses when relaying information about an issue or event to an audience” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 100). Kinder and Sanders (1990) suggested that media frames are embedded in political discourse, and while they write specifically about political communication, Scheufele (1999) implied that frames exist in other types of discourse as well. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) defined media frames as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events...suggest[ing] what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (p. 143). Taking a broader view of the role of media frames, Friedland & Zhong (1996) stated that frames serve as the “bridge between...larger social and cultural realms and every day understandings of social interaction” (p. 13). Finally, Gamson (1989) added to the discussion of media framing that the sender may create a frame intentionally, but at times the framing is unconscious.

The construction of frames and how they work can be understood at micro and macro levels. At the micro level, frames are created linguistically through keywords, syntax, grammar, symbols, and tone. In addition to the written word, the images included

in media objects constitute part of the frame that can be identified. This is not to say that an object has a single frame or interpretation; rather, as Entman (1991) asserted, “through repetition, placement, and reinforcing associations with each other, the words and images that comprise the frame render one basic interpretation more readily discernible, comprehensible and memorable than others”(p.7).

At a macro level, there is evidence that media frames, “although they are not intended to, move public opinion toward or away from a particular position on an issue, [and] do have implications for shaping public opinion” (Brewer & Gross, 2010, p. 160). Scheufele and Scheufele (2010) expanded this notion, suggesting that media frames have an *attitudinal effect* on individual frames, or that they have the ability to effectively shift the way individuals perceive media messages. Brewer and Gross (2010) and Scheufele and Scheufele (2010) reinforced the idea that media can shape public opinion about the news they are reporting or shape a *dominant reading* (Hall, 1980) that is easily understood by a majority of readers. While the journalist is a key player in frame creation, Scheufele (2004) insisted that we consider other influences. A journalist frames an issue in order to organize and structure information, but his or her opinions may be tempered by the social and political orientation of the media outlet and, at the macro level, by the elite external sources that influence the outlet itself (Scheufele, 2004, p. 405). Thus, media frames are not the sole creation of a journalist; rather, they are products of institutions and individuals, including journalists, who construct social reality.

Individual Frames

Individual frames can be defined as “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” (Entman, 1993, p. 53). Chong and Druckman (2007) stated that individual frames or “frame in thought” constitute what individuals “believe to be the most salient aspect of an issue” (p. 101). This determination of salience arises from internal structures of the mind that enable individuals to categorize and process information (Scheufele, 1999; Entman, 1993). Individual frames, which are shaped by family, values, politics and life experiences, etc., are always present and play an integral part in processing ubiquitous *media frames*. The real power of individual frames is in their ability to temper media frames. When media frames leave audiences with questions or doubts, audiences refer to their individual frames to “‘fill in’ the missing information and make appropriate inferences” (Iyengar, 2010, p. 186). When media frames are overly abundant or conflicting, individual frames prevail and people generally adhere to what they already know and understand (Iyengar, 2010, p. 186-187) while imprecise media frames are canceled out (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 102).

In 2007, Bantimaroudis and Kampanellou’s print media study identified what they called “cultural” frames (p.88) as an increasingly “significant frame mechanism explaining what drives modern conflicts” (p. 89). Cultural frames, media constructs that deal with cultural identities and entities (Bantimaroudis & Kampanellou, 2007, p. 88), may contribute to “subtle and insidious ways of reinforcing the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and what is ‘ours’ and what is ‘alien’” (Llobera 2004, p.43). Furthermore, “the manner in which information is presented, with a clear division between home and abroad and with an overwhelming domination of home news, are powerful ways of

structuring people's minds" (Llobera, 2004, p. 43). As I have already noted, and will explain more fully in the literature review, the Greek economic crisis gave rise to nation blaming and cultural stereotyping in the newspaper media. Bantimaroudis and Kampanellou's (2007) concept of cultural frames may be useful for understanding some of the frames employed by journalists and newspapers to cover the crisis. They note, too, that "equally significant is the question of what other institutions, apart from the media, promote these notions in the public mind" (Bantimaroudis & Kampanellou, 2007, p. 89). This question emphasizes that frames create meaning within a context that is socially constructed in conjunction with institutions and individuals.

Episodic vs. Thematic Framing

Iyengar (1991) studied how framing in American televised news reports influences audiences' attribution of responsibility to individual or societal causes, and identified two types of framing – episodic and thematic. Episodic framing is characterized by reporting that "takes the form of a case study or event-oriented report and depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances" (Iyengar, 1991, p.14). For example, news reports about a European summit attended by heads of state, a press conference, or a single protest would likely use episodic framing. Conversely, thematic framing "places public issues in some more general or abstract context and takes the form of a 'takeout,' or 'backgrounder,' report directed at general outcomes or conditions" (Iyengar, 1991, p. 14). Examples of such issues include poverty, race relations, or global warming. Iyengar (1991) added that thematic framing requires "in-depth, interpretive analysis" (p. 14) which is costly, time-consuming, and rarely employed by fast-paced

media outlets that seek to cover breaking events. Accordingly, episodic framing dominates news coverage by mainstream media outlets (Iyengar, 1991 and 2010).

Importantly, frames “identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments – evaluate causal agents and their effects” (Entman, 1993, p. 51). Therefore, audiences judge events differently when exposed to episodic versus thematic framing. Episodic framing causes audiences to focus on individuals or specific acts as the cause of an event (Iyengar, 1991). Alternatively, thematic frames lead audiences to interrogate “deep-seated societal or structural forces” (Iyengar, 2010, p. 186) which may be underlying events in the news. The prevalence of episodic framing, compounded by a tendency to reduce news to emotional vignettes, “trivializes political discourse and weakens the ability of the viewing public to hold elected officials responsible for policy failures” (Iyengar, 2010, p. 186). Episodic framing reduces global events, such as the Greek economic crisis, to a series of isolated instances, caused by individuals rather than social structures. Juko (2010) and Tracy (2012) asserted that episodic framing was used extensively by foreign newspapers to cover the Greek economic crisis. The specific effects of episodic framing on the coverage of the crisis are discussed in more detail in the literature review.

Theoretical Approach of this Study

Similarly to previous studies, I will use framing theory to study news coverage of the economic crisis. However, I will focus specifically on the ways in which Greek newspapers employed frames to describe and situate the crisis. I hypothesize that the frames in the Greek coverage will vary from those in foreign coverage given Greece’s political, social and historical context and its position at the epicenter of the crisis.

Frame analysis can be used to examine a breadth of information, coding for patterns and overall trends in reporting. Broad themes are useful to analyze as they may be indicative of trends in changing social or cultural attitudes and politics. Frame analysis can capture information that is present on the printed page, which can be quantified and used to draw conclusions about the way in which an event, such as the crisis, has been constructed. However, frame analysis does not examine what information is missing from the coverage. It also does not explain the context in which events occur. Nevertheless, framing analysis of news coverage may reveal ideologies that are active in a particular society as well as the powerful forces and institutions that support a particular media outlet.

In this study, frame analysis will be used to examine how Greek newspapers constructed the Greek economic crisis, what particular Greek outlets said, and what frames existed across different sources. This will then be compared with the frames identified in foreign newspapers. In short, my analysis will attempt to create a broad understanding of how the Greek press constructed the economic crisis and how these constructions differed from the ones articulated by foreign newspapers.

Chapter Four: Literature Review

In this literature review I discuss four areas of literature that have examined various aspects of the media's role in constructing economic issues in general and the Greek economic crisis more specifically. I begin by summarizing literature on the historical relationship between media, economic reporting, and the representation of economic events. Second, I discuss several journalistic practices that have been identified by scholars as having had an influence on foreign newspaper coverage of the Greek economic crisis. Third, I review published frame analysis studies which have identified specific frames that were used by foreign newspapers⁵ to talk about the Greek economic crisis. Finally, I present a discussion of counter narratives to these newspaper frames, which were articulated by a diverse group of media scholars and critics, and which provide alternate ways of understanding the events of the Greek economic crisis.

The Media, Economic Reporting, and Crisis Coverage

The media coverage of financial markets and financial media is a topic that has been studied intermittently and most often in the wake of financial crises (Lee, 2014). As a result, there is limited research on the topic. However, Lee (2014) wrote a meta-

⁵ I use the term foreign newspapers to describe all non-Greek newspapers. The frame studies reviewed in the literature review do not examine Greek newspaper coverage. I collectively call the newspapers examined in these studies "foreign newspapers".

analysis of 55 journalism and communication articles⁶ written since the 1980s that examine the role of news media in conjunction with various economic crises. It needs to be noted that most articles in Lee's study were published after the "2008 financial crisis" (p. 715) that originated in the United States. I rely on Lee's meta-analysis in this section as it helps to contextualize the role of news media in constructing economic and financial issues.

Lee considered the evolution of the financial media and their demands on reporting. Until the late 19th century, financial media were a forum for traders and business people to exchange information. When the middle class began to grow, however, there was an upsurge in the demand for facts and information. Through World War II, "economic news was about national economies rather than business and finance," whereas "postwar financial news reinforced the dominant economic thought of the moment, from Keynesian supply-side economics to Friedman's monetarism and the internationalization of economies" (p. 716). While economic news today continues to be driven by dominant economic thought, characterized by capitalist interests, it has also become highly personalized as individuals are viewed as agents of their own wealth through "opening retirement funds, borrowing for education, and viewing a home as an asset" (Lee, 2014, p. 715).

Lee notes that the role of journalists in covering economic news is highly contested. Economic and financial news is complex and protected by private interests, yet it impacts national and international interests. For example, economic news

⁶ The 55 articles were published in English language journals by scholars based in Latin America, North America, Europe, Asia, Australia, and New Zealand.

journalists, who produce content for the general public, often rely on financial institutions to provide newsworthy financial information. However, the information produced by financial institutions is generally intended for investors and business people. This information is then shared by journalists and undoubtedly influences public perception and opinion (Lee, 2014, p. 716-717). Finally, the intimate relationship between journalists and financial professionals, which depends on “press releases and fast-moving, complex financial information...stifles critical stories” (Lee, 2014, p. 717). While the strength and impact of these relationships and the reporting structure are difficult to measure, Lee argued that they can, and should, be studied through a critical cultural lens.

As Lee noted, “scholars agree that economies are linguistic constructs, but they diverge over whether language constructs or performs a financial crisis” (2014, 718). This paradox is central to deconstructing media and meaning in regard to the reporting of any information. Many scholars use framing analysis to analyze how an event was constructed linguistically, “viewing frames as both unconscious mental structures and linguistic extensions of the lived experience” (Lee, p. 718). Others believe the metaphors and analogies used in the news inform the activity of market participants who are thus engaged in performing the economy in a “mimetic spiral of discursive and material practices” (Goodnight & Green, 2010, p. 116). Similarly, Corner (1998) and Craig (1999) believed that televised financial media directly perform the economy through “highly statistical exposition” and an “array of graphics and texts” (cited in Lee, 2014, p. 719) presented for the benefit of viewers. Critique of the sources and selections is not included in this view. Instead, the news is believed to be factual, rather than value laden.

According to Lee, future research on the representation of finance and the economy ought to examine the role of international relations, gender, race and class in financial reporting and findings.

Across the literature, Lee found that the “2008 financial crisis” led scholars to discuss its relationship to other crises, such as “crises of higher education, data surveillance, credit score calculation, and online self-monitoring” (Lee, 2014, p. 723). According to Lee’s analysis, the neoliberal economic model and associated policies were the primary issue to which scholars related the “2008 financial crisis.” Fuchs, Schagranek, Hakken, and Breen (2010) argued that the crisis reflects a failure of neoliberal policy and capitalist culture. Meanwhile, Chakravartty and Schiller (2010) stated that the effect and dominance of neoliberal policies transformed economic reporting, thus “shaping what counts as salient objects of news coverage” (p. 677) through the lens of neoliberal ideology. Because media institutions today have been shaped by neoliberal ideology (Chakravartty & Schiller, 2010, p. 677), critical analysis of economic news, along with its historical and cultural, needs to problematize media representations of economic events. In an earlier article, Lee (2010) cautioned, however, that critical and cultural studies scholars should avoid “economic reductionism” (p. 309) and instead attend to the complexities of interdisciplinary research.

Journalistic Practices that Influenced the Framing of the Greek Economic Crisis

Lee’s analysis created a foundation upon which to extend research on the relationship between media and economic news coverage by using framing analysis through a critical cultural perspective. To that end, several scholars have discussed particular journalistic practices that shaped the foreign news framing of the Greek

economic crisis. Specifically, Juko (2010), Tracy (2012), Antoniadis (2013), Mylonas (2012), Mylonas and Kompatsiaris (2013), and Tzogopoulos (2013) pointed out that the pervasive use of episodic framing, as well as a selective style of reporting, and the use of tabloidization influenced crisis coverage by foreign newspapers. While the use of these journalistic practices is not unique to covering the Greek crisis, in this case they were employed so ubiquitously by foreign newspapers that the resulting discourse was rarely neutral. Instead, news about the Greek economic crisis was presented in dramatic and often polarizing ways, while dismissing and ignoring voices and opinions that countered mainstream reports.

Episodic Framing

As discussed earlier, episodic framing in the news is understood as “attending to events as they proceed without historical context” (Tracy, 2012, p. 516). Episodic framing reduces newsworthy events simply to events made up of details and personalities rather than seeing them as the result of underlying social and cultural concerns. Several scholars have argued that the Greek economic crisis was covered predominantly through the use of episodic framing. For example, in 2010, Sonja Juko published an article examining how the Greek economic crisis escalated so rapidly and how Greece’s level of trust in the marketplace diminished equally fast. According to Juko, beginning in late 2009, the markets began to show signs of declining trust in Greece’s economic stability which rapidly accelerated during the second quarter of 2010. From September 2009 to July 2010, the total number of German, U.S., and U.K. media reports about “Greece” and “public finance” increased fifteen-fold, despite the fact that no adjustments to Greece’s fundamental economic factors were made during this period (Juko, 2010, p. 35). This

sudden increase in reporting can be described as episodic framing. In other words, the news media focused on various events and actions by financial and governmental actors thus creating a narrative of an unfolding “crisis.”

Furthermore, as uncertainty about Greece grew, “media organizations started producing extra news, sometimes with a considerable time lag or even without a particular reference event” (Juko, 2010, p. 35). In this way, media organizations switched from acting as agenda setters, or creators of news, to “agenda senders” (p. 36)—essentially becoming mouthpieces for financial experts and market participants to share opinions about the causes and future direction of the crisis. Interestingly, as media coverage increased, so did the risk attributed to Greek bonds by ratings agencies and investors. In a 2013 study, Antoniadis found that the highest circulating newspapers in nine countries (France, Germany, Spain, India, China, U.S.A., U.K., Singapore, and Poland) also featured episodic framing and a higher numbers of reports during the May 2010 anti-austerity riots in Greece. Tracy (2012) and Tzogopoulos (2013), also found that U.S. and other foreign newspapers, employed episodic framing to cover the Greek economic crisis.

For these authors the impact of episodic framing varies. Juko (2010) believed that as the media employed an increasingly proactive approach, they actually shifted the financial perceptions of experts, traders, and economists in such a way as to exacerbate the seriousness of the Greek economic crisis, particularly when compared to actual financial figures. In contrast, Antoniadis (2013) concluded that the international news media may have repeated negative Greek discourse created by Greeks in reaction to the course of national events. However, this is the only study that suggests this

interpretation. Finally, Tracy (2012) stated that episodic framing creates an ahistorical, apolitical view of events as phenomena detached from other global concerns, further obfuscating the deeply systematic and underlying causes of an issue, in this case the Greek economic crisis.

Selective Reporting and Tabloidization

Selective reporting refers to the process by which journalists choose individuals to provide commentary on and participate in coverage of an event. In regard to economic news, media and financial markets maintain a “symbiotic relationship” (Juko, 2010, p. 33). The markets require reports created by media organizations in order to stay abreast of global, political, economic, and social events and to make informed trading decisions. As financial news becomes more widely available and the audience for it grows, so, too, does the demand for the product. In order to fill this demand, financial media organizations and journalists may proactively report on financial news as well as invite “neutral” financial experts and economists to write opinion pieces or act as expert sources. Both Juko (2010) and Mylonas and Kompatsiaris (2013) found that these “neutral” voices are more believable because they are not politicians. However, the result is that “financial news may reflect the views of financial market participants who act as a major source for financial media organizations” (Juko, 2010, p. 30).

Relationships between the news media and market participants continue to impact reporting and public perception of financial news. As a result, financial news is believed to be heavily skewed in favor of powerful, neoliberal economic actors who advocate for their interests and persuade audiences that the solutions they present are, indeed, the only solutions (Tracy, 2012; Mylonas & Kompatsiaris, 2013; Mylonas, 2012). Moreover,

Tracy (2012) found that counter narratives, when presented, are discredited. For example, a *USA Today* report included a Greek public-sector union official's statement that "Greece is the target. But Wall Street needs more easy targets. They need Spain. They need Portugal." However, the report then dismissed this characterization as "one of many conspiracy theories" (Tracy, 2012, p. 520).

Mylonas (2012) pointed out that "most people are not financial economists, they are not merchants and they are not bankers" (p. 654). Because of this, despite the wealth of available information about the Greek economic crisis, most people do not understand the systematic and structural issues underpinning the crisis (Tracy, 2012). As a result, the Greek economic crisis was presented largely as a spectacle to be followed and enjoyed by viewers in a way similar to reality TV, and it has remained unquestioned by publics. In Western countries media portrayed the reckless Greeks as antagonists who stirred a worldwide crisis (Mylonas, 2012, p. 655). Furthermore, episodic framing created the impression that the crisis was a series of catastrophic events that audiences anticipated with suspense. The sensationalized (Juko, 2010) and spectacular approach used to report on the crisis led to what Mylonas (2012) called the "tabloidization of the crisis" (p. 656). He, as well as Juko (2010), noted that the commercial, profit driven nature of media organizations encourage using an entertaining approach which is evident in the use of value-laden vocabulary, expressions and headlines. This approach, however, dehumanized Greek citizens who were suffering from 50% youth unemployment (TradingEconomics.com, 2014) and, instead, normalized economic despair as a natural consequence of national character defects.

Frame Studies of the Greek Economic Crisis

A handful of scholars have published frame analysis studies of the foreign and international newspaper coverage of the Greek economic crisis (Juko, 2010; Tracy, 2012; Mylonas, 2012; Antoniadis, 2013; Tzogopoulos, 2013). These studies were identified through keyword searches, in English and Greek, of cross-referenced journal articles, conference presentations, and online resources, such as www.eliamep.gr (the website for the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy). The studies that I identified analyzed the news frames present in 34 newspapers from 12 countries. These newspapers were mainly respected foreign national broadsheets, but a few were national tabloids. Some of the newspapers analyzed were: *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Guardian*, *Le Monde*, *Der Spiegel*, *Bild*, *The Financial Times*, *The Korea Times*, *China Daily*, *El Pais*, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Le Figaro*, and *La Repubblica*. The newspapers came from the following 12 countries: Germany, United States, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, China, Korea, India, Japan, Poland, and Singapore. Importantly, these studies did not examine Greek newspaper coverage of the crisis. In terms of chronology, each study covered a different time period, but collectively they traced the framing of the Greek economic crisis from its earliest stages in September 2009 through Greece's request for a second bailout in December 2011. A detailed timeline of the events of these two years is included in Appendix A.

Juko (2010), Tracy (2012), Mylonas (2012), Antoniadis (2013), and Tzogopoulos (2013) used frame analysis to explain the ways in which foreign newspapers represented the Greek economic crisis to their readers. Across their studies, these scholars distinguished five predominant frames that newspapers commonly used to cover the

Greek economic crisis. Below is a table describing the five frames, followed by an in-depth explanation of each.

Table 1: Frames Identified by Frame Analyses Studies of Foreign Newspapers

Frame	Description
“Culturalist” (Mylonas, 2012), “Incorrigible Greeks” (Tracy, 2012), or “Corrupt, Lazy, and Morally Offside” (Antoniades, 2013)	The Greeks are to blame for the crisis and the specific reasons are rooted in Greek national culture.
“Economic” (Mylonas, 2012; Tzogopoulos, 2013) or “Austerity” (Tracy, 2012)	Harsh economic tactics, such as spending cuts and austerity measures, are the only way to compensate for the deeply flawed Greek culture.
“Eschatological” (Mylonas, 2012), “Greek Contagion” (Tracy, 2012), “Metastasis” (Tzogopoulos, 2013), or “Greek virus” (Juko, 2010)	The Greek crisis is a viral disease and must be contained before it infects European and global economies.
“Narcissistic” (Mylonas, 2012)	The Greek crisis is causing other nations, particularly Germany, to suffer financially. E.g., “What Do The Bankrupt Greeks Cost Us?”
“Spite” (Mylonas, 2012)	Greece’s suffering is punishment for problems that Greeks created and should have to solve.

The “Culturalist” (Mylonas, 2012), “Incorrigible Greeks” (Tracy, 2012), or “Corrupt, Lazy, and Morally Offside” (Antoniades, 2013) frame blames the economic crisis on the Greek national character which is described as essentially backward, childlike, and not Western enough. In many news reports, Greeks are described as lazy, corrupt spendthrifts, and unwilling to shift to more European ways. These “character

defects” are attributed in a post-colonial sense to the backwardness of the underdeveloped South and warm tourist destinations where life is slower and simpler. Greece and its corrupt politicians and citizens are viewed as the cause of the crisis, while traders and speculators are considered “victims” of the irresponsible Greek nation. The use of this frame creates the perception of a cultural shortfall compared to Western nations who embrace neoliberal ideas, thus reinforcing the concept that neoliberal policies and culture are the “bitter pill” that Greece must swallow (Mylonas and Kompatsiaris, 2013).

According to Mylonas & Kompatsiaris (2013), the beliefs signified by the “Economic” (Mylonas, 2012; Tzogopoulos, 2013) or “Austerity” (Tracy, 2012) frame are natural extensions of the beliefs that underlie the “Culturalist” (Mylonas, 2012) frame. The Greeks, like insolent children, must be punished with austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU in order to learn their lesson. By first blaming the Greek national character and then presenting neoliberal “solutions” such as spending cuts on social welfare, the privatization of utilities and services, and the reduction of wages, neoliberal policies are framed as the necessary means for Greece’s recovery. While these were requirements to receive IMF and EU funds, the news media backed these demands as logical and effective ways to reverse the downturn of the Greek economy and to protect Europe.

A third, fear-driven “Eschatological” (Mylonas, 2012), “Greek Contagion” (Tracy, 2012), “Greek virus” (Juko, 2010), or “Metastasis” (Tzogopoulos, 2013) frame concerns the notion that if the crisis is not averted in Greece, it will spread to other developed nations and the global economy could collapse. The contagion frame equates the crisis to a disease. The crisis is like an infection; it has a carrier (Greece), the

treatment is austerity measures and, if left untreated, it will spread rapidly and infect other economies. In context, this frame emphasizes the idea that Greece is sick and that if strict austerity measures are not enforced to bring Greece in line with neoliberal economic standards, then the global economic system could enter a state of financial emergency. Together, these three frames indicate that the “lazy Greeks” must be reprimanded through austerity measures in order to save Europe, and reinforce the idea that neoliberal policies are the only solution to rectify the problem.

In a study of popular German newspapers (Mylonas 2012), two additional frames emerge. These are the “Narcissist” and “Spite” frames. In February 2010, the *Wall Street Journal* reported that “an increasingly vitriolic tit-for-tat between Greek and German media threaten[ed] to poison the public debate over how and who should provide Greece with financial support” (Granitsas and Paris, 2010). This “heated public debate” provides context for understanding the appearance of the “Spite” and “Narcissist” frames in German newspapers. The “Narcissist” frame appears in headlines like “What Do The Bankrupt Greeks Cost Us” or “25 Billion for the Greeks. And What About Us?” (Mylonas, 2012, p. 660). Resentment toward Greeks and frustration over the economic support that Germany was asked to provide frame Germany as a “homogeneous nation suffering from irresponsible others” (p. 660).

Finally, the “Spite” frame, which is reinforced by the “Culturalist” frame, blames the Greeks for their own suffering and represents a loss of European solidarity (Mylonas, 2012). According to the German newspaper *Bild-Zeitung*’s “Spite” framing, the Greeks should solve the crisis themselves (Mylonas, 2012). Again, this approach is evidence of a neoliberal ideological framing of the crisis whereby systems and structures are ignored

and individual nations are left to compete with one another. The struggle between the solidarity of the EU and uncertainty about its ability to support a weak member state is a major tension made evident through these frames studies of foreign newspaper coverage of the Greek economic crisis. In general, foreign newspapers framed Greece as the cause of the crisis rather than seeing the crisis as a symptom of larger unresolved economic issues in Europe.

Counter Narratives

A number of scholars, including Douzinas (2010), Kouvelakis (2011), and Zizek (2010, 2012), critiqued the influence of the media on international economic events and on discourses that constituted the economic crisis. These scholars articulated counter narratives, or alternative perspectives, that were missing from mainstream media coverage. As discussed previously, studies of foreign newspaper coverage of the Greek economic crisis revealed five significant frames. However, these frames tend to simplify the issues, thereby obscuring systems and structures that shape the global economy and promote neoliberal ideologies. In this section I outline five main counter narratives, put forth by critical scholars, which provide different ideas and explanations about the causes of the crisis as well as its implications for Greece and the international community.

1. Media as Advancing a Neoliberal Agenda

Douzinas (2010), Zizek (2010; 2012), and Juko (2010) took critical positions toward the foreign newspaper coverage, asserting that media have amplified the problems generated by the crisis. According to Douzinas (2010), the “patriotic media turn the state into the muscleman for the market internally” (p. 298), and are essentially the megaphone for neoliberal ideology. To accomplish this, the media use financial experts to suggest

that the problem be left to the experts so as not to be a nuisance to politicians and people (Douzinas, 2010; Zizek, 2010). The dominant story that the crisis is Greece's fault aims to depoliticize and naturalize the crisis while presenting austerity measures as "neutral financial logic" rather than as political choices (Zizek, 2010, p. 85). In addition to international media's overt neoliberal standpoint, "the Western media has been laced...with racism and orientalism" (Douzinas, 2010, p. 291) toward the Greek people which has been used to "send ripples of fear" (Zizek, 2012) across global markets. In short, "the Greeks...are at war with the European economic establishment" (Zizek, 2012), which is amplified by international media's reliance on elite economic discourse (Juko, 2010).

2. The End of the Post-War Social Contract

The post-war social contract, as it relates to post World War II Europe, refers to what Collingwood (1942) saw as "a necessary reinvigoration of popular sovereignty and freedom inherited from the Enlightenment [combined] with the more recent commitments to social welfare and the reduction of inequality" (cited in Zunz, 2002, p. 1). While Greece was never a large, wealthy, or populous nation, as a European nation it was party to the so-called post-WWII social contract. Kouvelakis (2011) noted that Greece's post-war social contract was never as strong as elsewhere in Europe; nevertheless, the austerity measures forced on Greece as a condition of its financial bailout were similar to those imposed on developing nations. According to Douzinas (2010) and Zizek (2012) these financial measures, allegedly intended to reform Greece, instead signaled the end of the post-war social contract and of support for public provisions for education, social welfare, and workers' rights. The reduction of these social structures was the beginning

of “shock therapy” (Kouvelakis, 2011) for Greek society in a way that mirrors the dramatic restructuring of post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe. The decimation of the social infrastructure intended to protect the middle class, was just the beginning.

In 2011, Lucas Papademos, former head of the European Common Bank and one of the orchestrators of Greece’s admission to the Eurozone, was selected as Greece’s Prime Minister in lieu of elections. This decision, made by Eurozone leaders and influential bankers, was called the “soft” or “bloodless coup” (Kouvelakis, 2011). For some, this signified the betrayal of the Greek people by its own ruling class who were colluding with the IMF, the European Commission, and European Central Bank—nicknamed the Troika—for economic and political power. The betrayal, the “coup,” and the loss of rights and social support led to widespread riots in Greece, which are central to the third counter narrative.

3. Riots Against Systemic Violence

As described previously, foreign newspapers framed the Greeks as lazy and incorrigible people who staged protests so that they could maintain short work hours and reap the benefits of EU membership (Mylonas, 2012; Tracy, 2012). However, Greek riots and protests against austerity measures, which began in May 2010, may also be viewed as a symbol of the solidarity of the Greek people against the systemic violence brought against them by those in power. Moreover, they indicate what Kouvelakis (2011) deemed “waves of social unrest.” According to Douzinas (2010), Greece’s social unrest was a natural result of a political and social system that had been manipulated to serve the political and economic elite of Greece and the EU at the expense of the middle and working classes. These protests were not only about the hours that some Greeks

work or the wages that they earn, but, about systemic and ideological injustices exacted upon the Greek people. Greeks are experiencing violent, neoliberal oppression that is destroying their social infrastructure and forcing economic regression (Zizek, 2010). In response, they have united at riots claiming, “We have rights. We, the nobodies, the school kids, the students, the unemployed, the generations that must survive on a salary of 600 Euros, are everything” (Douzinas, 2010, p. 287). This statement underscores the fact that Greeks are uniting to demand positive⁷, collective rights that are threatened by the implementation of austerity measures. In this counter narrative the riots are necessary for Greeks’ to demand positive rights guaranteed by the post-war social contract and, thus, to survive. They are not demonstrating over frivolous matters as some media portrayals indicated (Mylonas, 2012). The nation is facing an existential crisis and Greeks are demanding basic rights, not long summer vacations. Moreover, as those living in Greece fought for their positive, communal rights, the government found itself struggling to regain credibility in the midst of economic crisis.

4. The Greek Economic Crisis Symbolizes the De-legitimization of the State

For Greek politicians, trying to balance the tension between civil unrest and the strict austerity measures demanded by the Troika was untenable. These two masters, the Troika and the Greek people, maintain contradictory demands on the state. Thus, Greek politicians were forced to take sides and by agreeing to austerity measures they prioritized the Greek state’s responsibility to the international community over the Greek

⁷ Positive rights are defined as rights that must be provided to individuals by a state or other entity. For example, the belief that citizens have a right to healthcare is a positive right. These stand in contrast to negative rights which are defined as rights that require others not impede, such as the right to life. Sandra Fredman provides an extended discussion on positive rights in her book *Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties* (2008).

people. However, the government's choice to prove itself to the Troika, not to its people, may also be a matter of survival (Douzinas, 2010). Zizek (2012) warned, though, that when governments no longer serve the people, they serve the markets, and in doing so demolish democracy. While Greece has surely not demolished democracy, the civil unrest and the political upheaval represented by extremely large national protests and the "bloodless coup" (Kouvelakis, 2011) may indicate a difference between the government's and the citizens' ideas about "serving the people" (Zizek, 2010).

Nevertheless, the Greek economic crisis may also be viewed as an opportunity for change. For Zizek (2010, 2012) the strife in Greece is not a sudden catastrophe as the media have portrayed it. Instead, it will become a normal way of functioning unless this faltering political system is checked. This does not mean that Greece must attempt to hold onto its pre-crisis paradigm, but rather that this is an opportunity to repoliticize and reimagine a new world in a way akin to the transformations ignited by the French Revolution and the birth of Greek democracy (Zizek, 2010). Greece was already fragmenting internally, with the Far Right threatening that if the Left gains power the country will become the "Cuba of Europe" (Kouvelakis, 2011). This type of division and renewed fervor for national, sovereign interests, as opposed to European interests, could further divide Europe and weaken it against financial institutions (Zizek, 2010). Foreign newspapers generated fear that similar financial and political woes would spread to other countries (Mylonas, 2012; Tracy, 2012; Tzogopoulos, 2013). Conversely, Kouvelakis

(2011) and Zizek (2010) suggested that economic collapse will only compromise the integrity of the nation-state system if nations like Greece fail to reimagine their futures.⁸

5. Greece as a Guinea Pig for Neoliberal Restructuring

The counter narratives discussed above build strength on the idea that Greece is a guinea pig for European financial policies, which was also expressed in some of the framing studies (Mylonas, 2012; Tracy, 2012; Juko, 2010; Tzogopoulos, 2013; Antoniadou, 2013). Some scholars expanded this argument even further to claim that Greece was a testing ground for neoliberal financial policies that have global implications (Douzinas, 2010; Kouvelakis, 2011; Zizek, 2010 & 2012). Frame analysis studies raised the question, “How did Greece become the epicenter of this economic crisis?” However, they left it largely unanswered. These frame studies suggest that the perspectives portrayed in foreign newspapers are incomplete and that the power of the neoliberal marketplace may be a factor, but their findings were presented only as possibilities. By contrast, Douzinas (2010), Kouvelakis (2011), and Zizek (2012) strongly asserted that neoliberal ideology is driving the austerity measures and financial restructuring to which Greece has agreed. As neoliberal ideology drove “establishment” economic thought (Zizek, 2010), Greece became the center of this crisis, or an experiment, as the world looked on to see what the future might hold for other financially weakened nations.

Douzinas (2010) and Kouvelakis (2011) were optimistic that Greece would survive the crisis and might even usher in a new social era, whereby the neoliberal project

⁸ The rise of Greece’s far left-wing party, Syriza, the referendum “Oxi” vote on July 5, 2015, the government’s failure to heed that vote, and the resignation and re-election of Alexis Tsipras seem to have confirmed some of these predictions regarding a compromised nation-state in the face of economic collapse.

would be reexamined by politicians and average citizens alike. Yet, if Greece, which was targeted because of its weak social contract, cultural stereotypes, and history of corruption and clientelism, falters dramatically, other EU countries could be quick to follow (Douzinas, 2010, Kouvelakis, 2011). Žižek (2012) suggested that the dominant media narratives about Greece (e.g., Greeks are lazy, Greek national sovereignty is threatened, Greeks are humanitarian victims, Greece is at war with the EU's economic establishment) are simply media distractions and that Greece is actually a testing ground for a new socio-economic model with potentially unlimited application, wherein bankers and experts demolish democracy for financial control and gain. Finally, as Juko (2010) pointed out, the ratings agencies were not unbiased, logical entities; instead they were influenced by newspaper reports which stirred fear about Greece's credit worthiness and financial reputation. This discovery alone raises doubts about the actual versus the perceived threat of Greece's economic crisis, about the media spectacle that ensued, and about the necessity of financial restructuring in Greece that was informed by neoliberal economic ideology.

Gaps in the Literature

The contradictory frames and counter narratives identified by scholars interrogating the Greek economic crisis raise interesting questions for this thesis and for future research. Published frame analyses expose a dominant, ideologically neoliberal discourse that appears in the newspapers of 12 countries. Given the cultural, social, and economic differences among those countries, the consistency in frames may indicate the power of global economic markets and discourses that increasingly drive society and politics within national contexts as well. However, Greek newspaper coverage of the

Greek economic crisis has not been examined by scholars.⁹ My thesis aims to address this gap in the literature. As Greece was the target of blame and discussion in global media, Greek newspaper coverage may reveal interesting new findings in relation to dominant news frames and counter narratives already described. By examining the frames used by Greek newspapers to cover the Greek economic crisis I will begin to fill a gap in the existing literature on this topic.

⁹ Mylonas & Kompatsiaris (2013) examined the discourse of two Greek elites, philosopher Stelios Ramfos and “self-designated marketing guru” (p.16) Peter Economides, individuals who are influencing international discourse on the Greek economic crisis, but who cannot represent Greek voices and perspectives.

Chapter Five: Methodology and Study Design

Following previous studies of international news coverage of the Greek economic crisis, this thesis employs frame analysis as its method. Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) described two types of frame analysis: inductive and deductive. They define inductive frame analysis as “an approach [that] involves analyzing a news story with an open view to attempt to reveal the array of possible frames, beginning with very loosely defined preconceptions of these frames” (p. 94). Conversely, deductive frame analysis involves “predefining certain frames as content analytic variables to verify the extent to which these frames occur in the news” (p. 95).

The frame studies reviewed above (Antoniades, 2013; Tzogopoulos, 2013; Mylonas, 2012; Tracey, 2012; Juko, 2010), utilized inductive frame analysis to identify frames present in the various foreign newspapers. These now predefined frames could be used to conduct a deductive frame analysis (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), and thus consider the extent to which the Greek press employed the same frames as newspapers outside of Greece. However, inductive analysis is the only means to identify frames that may exist in the Greek newspapers but that have not been used in foreign newspapers. Therefore, inductive frame analysis is necessary to test the hypothesis that Greek newspapers will contain at least some unique frames, particularly given the severity of austerity measures, the national backlash that resulted in strikes, protests and violence, and the intensity of the blame placed on Greece by foreign media (Mylonas, 2012;

Antoniades, 2013; Tracy, 2012). Finally, the Greek economic crisis is a site of contestation (i.e., media coverage seeks to answer such questions as: Whose crisis is it? Who caused it? How did it happen?); it has enflamed nationalist rhetoric, and has deep national implications for Greeks. For these reasons, I chose to use inductive framing analysis for this study.

Reflexivity

The inductive approach to frame analysis is a qualitative and exploratory method that is highly dependent on the subjectivity of the researcher who is conducting the analysis of the media texts. Because of this, a reflexive approach to conducting the analysis of the news texts is essential for maintaining the integrity of the findings. Lindlof & Taylor (2011) referred to reflexivity as the “heartbeat of a qualitative research project. Reflexivity – the process of engaging in mutual recognition of, and adaptation with, others – enables the researcher to manage the twisting, turning road of qualitative research” (p. 72). Reflexivity demands that the researcher acknowledge her relationship to the data, the research sites and all relationships that connect her to the research. In doing so, a qualitative researcher acknowledges her subjectivity as a strength that “provides better data” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 72). The researcher’s subjectivity contributes to her unique understanding of the data, texts and research sites and leads to deeper analysis because she understands nuances that others may overlook.

In regard to this thesis, my reflexive interaction with the texts will undoubtedly enrich my ability to analyze the ways in which Greek newspapers framed the Greek economic crisis. Between the years 2003 and 2007 I lived in Greece for a total of 24 months. I spent this time working, studying Modern Greek and eventually conducting

research sponsored by the Fulbright Foundation in Greece, the U.S. State Department, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy and Doctors of the World–Greece. I spent equal time in Athens and on Spetses, a small fishing island, which, combined with my work and research, exposed me to a range of lifestyles, as well as social, political, and cultural issues that exist in Greece. It is exactly my experiences that led me to this research topic and to interrogate how Greek newspapers framed the Greek economic crisis which has had significant impacts on the day-to-day lives of Greek people.

Time Frame Selection

This study analyzes how two Greek newspapers framed and discussed the Greek economic crisis from May 3 to May 9, 2010. During the period leading up to and including the first economic bailout offered to Greece by the EU and IMF, many pivotal, internationally significant events occurred in Greece. First, Greece implemented two rounds of austerity measures to persuade leaders and lenders (Germany, France, and the IMF) that they should offer financial support in the form of bailout packages. Second, Greece's credit rating was downgraded by Standard & Poor's. Third, its national debt was revealed to be much higher than previously reported and the international community was in a frenzy over the impact that economic collapse in Greece might have on the Eurozone, the EU, and beyond.

I selected May 3–9, 2010 because this week-long period includes a few days prior to and after the announcement of the first bailout package on May 5, 2010. This was a turning point event through which Greece entered into new international loans with long-term effects on the country and the region. This bailout was agreed to by Greece, the Troika key EU member states, such as Germany which was reflected in increased

international coverage of the crisis (Tzogopoulos, 2013). Further narrowing the sample period was necessary in creating a feasible qualitative analysis as a solo researcher. To do this, I selected articles from the four days with the highest volume of coverage regarding the Greek economic crisis from May 3-9, 2010. In *Kathimerini* these days were May 4, 5, 7, and 9, 2010. In *Eleftherotypia* the days with the most coverage were May 3, 5, 7, and 9.

Papathanassopoulos (2014) analyzed data from approximately the same time period, which he described as “one of the most painful for Greece’s international image”. During this time, Greece was collapsing and the foreign press were very hostile toward Greek pleas for help (Papathanassopoulos 2015, p. 108). In the frame studies I reviewed, researchers collected data from longer time periods between 2009 and 2012, ranging from 9 to 27 months, yet they all included May 2010. Many of the frames identified in those studies were direct attacks on the Greek nation and its national character, a fact that is now widely accepted (Papathanassopoulos, 2014). In light of this, it is informative to examine the frames used by Greek newspapers during the same time frame and find out if a different set of frames emerge that explain the crisis and its impacts from a Greek perspective.

Newspaper Selection

For this study, I selected and coded articles published in the online editions of the Greek national newspapers *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia*. Following is a brief description of each newspaper, including their political leanings, readership and distribution, years in print and reporting style.

The printed news has long been a respected political and cultural establishment in Greece. *Perriptera* (kiosks) cloaked in dozens of newspapers decorate street corners throughout the country and *kaffeineia* (coffee houses) are gathering places to read, discuss, and debate the news and current events. In general, Greece's newspapers support particular political ideologies or maintain strong political leanings (Zaharopoulos & Paraschos, 1993). The newspapers selected for data collection are large distribution, daily newspapers that cover from right-wing, conservative and left-wing, liberal party affiliations. *Kathimerini* (The Daily) is considered "an institution of Greek journalism" (Zaharopoulos & Paraschos, 1993, p. 20) and was established in 1918. Originally it was known for its politically conservative, more factual and less polemic writing style. Today it remains a traditional broadsheet in style and is regarded as a conservative institution. Voxeurop.eu states that *Kathimerini*'s circulation is 26,246 daily and is known as "Greece's most reliable newspaper" ("*I Kathimerini*" 2011).

Eleftherotypia (Freedom of the Press) was established in the wake of the junta that ruled Greece in the 1960s and 70s.¹⁰ Striking journalists created *Eleftherotypia* in 1975¹¹ and it became known as the "reporter's newspaper." Its left-of-center politics made it very popular during the post-junta era. *Eleftherotypia* has, from its creation, given voice to far left politics and has been most supportive of and supported by the national socialist party, PASOK. According to voxeurop.eu, *Eleftherotypia* had a daily

¹⁰ Greece was ruled by a military dictatorship led by three colonels from April 21, 1967 to July 24, 1974. For the first three years, the dictators "prohibited any announcement, publication of information, or comment that in any manner opposes directly or indirectly the regime." In 1970, censorship was ended, but "many journalists suffered under the grip of [the] regime" (Zaharopoulos & Paraschos, 1993, p. 28-29).

¹¹ In April 1975, there was a reporters' strike over "salaries, benefits and working conditions that left Greece without newspapers for more than two weeks" (Zaharopoulos & Paraschos, 1993, p. 30).

circulation of approximately 39,335 and is known for its “exhaustive and often riveting approach to national news” (“*Eleftherotypia*” June 16, 2011). Despite the fact that it has been one of the most widely circulated newspapers in the country, *Eleftherotypia* went bankrupt in 2011, printing only four editions that year. It was re-launched in 2013.

Keywords and Article Selection

Because I used inductive framing, entire newspaper articles were my unit of analysis, rather than only article headlines or leads, which are the units of analysis in most of the frame studies I reviewed. The analysis of full article texts enabled me to produce a more refined understanding of the frames and crisis naming conventions used by the Greek press and to explain how these operated and made sense within the Greek context.

Data for this research was collected directly from the newspapers’ websites. I analyzed the selected articles in the original Greek; however, I translated relevant excerpts and examples into English for the purposes of the thesis. Each newspaper has an online archive along with an advanced search tool. The articles were identified using only the key word *κρίση* or *crisis* to ensure that the broadest range of articles could be analyzed to see when, how, and why Greek newspapers discussed the crisis.

From the 280 articles in *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia*, the initial search identified 178 articles in *Eleftherotypia* and 102 articles in *Kathimerini*. From these 280 articles, 212 remained in the sample, 128 from *Eleftherotypia* and 84 from *Kathimerini*. After reviewing the articles, 68 were eliminated from the study. They were eliminated because although they mentioned the word crisis, they did not focus on the Greek economic crisis. Articles from *Eleftherotypia* and *Kathimerini* constituted 60.4% and

39.6% of the sample, respectively. Through my own research, I have noted that *Eleftherotypia*, true to its name (Freedom of the Press), allows many guest contributions from non-traditional journalists (e.g. politicians and professors) to be published; this rarely happens in *Kathimerini*. This may explain, at least in part, why *Eleftherotypia* had more coverage of the crisis than did *Kathimerini* during the same time period. The Greek economic crisis and its causes, impacts and politics were the main focus of the 212 articles in the final data sample.

Identifying “Crisis” Naming Conventions and Greek Newspaper Frames

Across these 212 articles the word crisis appeared 465 times, 291 times in *Eleftherotypia* and 174 times in *Kathimerini*. Further analysis indicated that in 416 instances, the word crisis was accompanied by zero to one descriptor (e.g., crisis, Greek crisis), and in 49 instances it appeared with two or more descriptors (e.g., economic and political crisis; deep economic crisis). Each combination of a descriptor plus the word crisis was counted, identifying 526 naming conventions for the crisis¹². The naming conventions were sorted into eight categories using an inductive approach.

I read each of the 212 articles in the sample multiple times identifying and coding frames using an inductive approach (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Every article was assigned one primary frame. A small number of articles (28 or 13% of the total sample) were found to have a secondary frame; however, secondary frames are not included in the findings.

¹² If crisis appeared by itself or with one adjective, it was counted one time. If crisis appeared with two or more adjectives (Greek debt crisis) it was counted two times for identifying the crisis as both a Greek crisis and as a debt crisis. By doing this I arrived at 526 naming conventions used to describe the crisis. Of these 526 combinations, 324 were found in *Eleftherotypia* and 202 were found in *Kathimerini*.

Chapter Six: Findings and Discussion

The data sample was selected from four days of news coverage in two Greek newspapers, *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia*. It is comprised of 212 articles published on the newspapers' websites between May 3 and May 9, 2010. Analyzing the sample, I identified seven frames across coverage of the Greek economic crisis by *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia*, as well as eight categories for the use of the word "crisis" throughout the entire sample.

RQ1: What terms did Greek newspapers use to describe and name the crisis?

Analysis identified 526 combinations of the word crisis with various descriptors. In all cases, the word crisis was accompanied by zero to four descriptors and each combination of crisis plus one of the descriptors was counted as an individual occurrence. The word crisis appeared 465 times and I identified 526 naming convention occurrences across the 212 articles. All naming conventions were inductively analyzed and coded into categories of similar terms (see Table 2). Through this analysis, I identified eight major categories of describing the crisis across the two newspapers. First, I discuss the naming conventions and categories used in the. Next, I look at the similarities and differences between how the two papers used the word crisis.


Table 2: Crisis Naming Categories¹³

Crisis Categories	Category Count in <i>Eleftherotypia</i>	% of Category in <i>Eleftherotypia</i>	Category Count in <i>Kathimerini</i>	% of Category in <i>Kathimerini</i>	Total Count of Sample in Category	Total % of Sample in Category
Crisis	133	41.0%	84	41.6%	217	41.3%
Financial	61	18.8%	60	29.7%	121	23%
Greek/ National	59	18.2%	32	15.8%	91	17.3%
European/ International	23	7.1%	10	5%	33	6.3%
Unprecedented	20	6.2%	4	2%	24	4.6%
Political	13	4.0%	4	2%	17	3.2%
Systemic/ Social	11	3.4%	8	4%	19	3.6%
Capitalist	4	1.2%	0	-	4	0.8%
Totals	324	100%	202	100%	526	100%

¹³ See Appendix B for a complete list of exact descriptors, by frame category, used in each newspaper.

CHART 1: CRISIS NAMING CATEGORIES

■ Crisis ■ Financial ■ National/Greek ■ International/European
■ Unprecedented ■ Political ■ Social/Systemic ■ Capitalist



KATHIMERINI

ELEFTHERTOTYPIA

Analysis identified three dominant categories of descriptors for the crisis: *crisis*, *financial* and *Greek/national*. The most common category for describing the crisis was simply referring to it as *crisis*. It was used 218 times (41.5%) in the following ways: “a crisis,” “the crisis,” “this crisis,” “latest crisis,” “current crisis,” or within a phrase such as, “...there is no crisis” (Papahela, A., May 9, 2010). The absence of and limited use of adjectives and articles with the word crisis suggests the crisis was depicted as ubiquitous, and therefore requires little or no explanation. Using crisis in this way also emphasizes the scale of the crisis by not limiting its meaning.

Second, the crisis was described as *financial* 121 times (23.0% of the sample). Examples of descriptors within this category are: “economic crisis”, “debt crisis”, “financial crisis,” and “lending crisis.” Through the *financial* category the crisis was identified as an issue that raises concerns about and affects Greece’s economic stability.

The third largest category was *Greek/National*, specifically, “the Greek crisis,” “sovereign crisis,” “national crisis,” and “our own crisis.” Referring to the crisis in these ways identifies it as something that belongs to Greece, is situated in the physical location of Greece, affects people living in Greece and defines life in Greece during this time period. As these first three categories account for 81.6% of the sample, they influence the construction of the Greek economic crisis in the two newspapers I analyzed considerably more than the following categories.

The next five categories, *European/international*, *unprecedented*, *political*, *systemic/social*, and *capitalist*, appear less frequently, accounting for 18.4% of the sample, yet they provide interesting perspectives on how the crisis was discussed and constructed by the Greek newspapers *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia*. The

European/International category (33 times, 6.3%) indicates that the crisis is not simply a Greek crisis, but rather a crisis that is impacted by and has an impact on geopolitical entities outside of Greece. Examples include, “a crisis in the Eurozone,” “crisis of the Euro,” “global crisis,” and “global economic crisis.” In these examples the crisis is described as impacting the Eurozone, a physical and political entity, the Euro, a regional currency and the globe, or nations, people, and systems everywhere.

The *unprecedented* category (23 times, 4.4%) includes examples such as: “great crisis,” “unprecedented crisis,” “dire crisis,” “self-sustaining crisis,” “acute crisis,” “huge crisis,” “multifaceted crisis,” “abysmal crisis,” “terrible crisis,” “grave crisis,” and “manifold crisis.” These examples, while different, underscore the unpredictability, and precedent-setting nature of the crisis, while constructing it as an ominous presence that overshadows near-term hope for Greece.

The next crisis category is *systemic/social* which depicts the crisis as the result of underlying phenomena or issues (19 times, 3.6%) that ought to be addressed. Descriptors used in this category include: “a deeper, structural crisis,” “crisis of institutions and values,” “deep crisis,” “limit and structural crisis,” “general crisis of civilization,” and “social and moral crisis.” By describing the crisis in these ways, journalists, editors, and guest contributors are suggesting that fundamental systemic and structural issues are fueling the crisis and thus the crisis is not simply about money, loans or bankruptcy, but about the ways in which “deep” systems have fostered crisis.

Additionally, the crisis is described as being a *political* crisis (17 times, 3.2%), which highlights tensions in the Greek political landscape. Descriptor examples within this category are: “political crisis,” “government in crisis,” “legitimacy crisis,”

“credibility crisis,” “legitimation crisis,” “inner-party crisis,” and “fiscal crisis.” “Fiscal crisis” was included in the political category given that fiscal relates to a government’s financial and tax responsibilities to the public. The instability within and between parties has created an ever shifting Greek political landscape. These examples support an argument that politicians and the troubled political system are exacerbating the crisis, overlooking the demands of the people and losing their credibility in the process.

Finally, the *capitalist* category is used infrequently (4 times, 0.8%), however it represents a critique of the neoliberal and capitalist systems that shape the European and developed countries. This category appears in descriptor examples such as, “crisis of the parties serving the capitalist systems,” “invest in crisis,” “deepest capitalist crisis,” and “international capitalist crisis.” Having described the categories used to discuss crisis throughout the data set, I now discuss the ways in which the press framed the news across the selected coverage.

Naming the Crisis, Constructing Reality

My findings depict three dominant categories for naming the Greek economic crisis which are: *crisis*, *financial*, and *Greek/national*. In some regard, these categories on their own are not surprising. However, through a critical lens, they inform a discussion about the way newspapers report events and thus construct reality. An overwhelming majority of instances, 41.3% of the sample, were categorized as simply *crisis*. In doing so, the newspaper articles normalize crisis as the status quo, thus minimizing the urgency that ought to be associated with crisis. Crisis or κρίση is a word of Greek origin. In Greek it means a decision or judgment as well as an event requiring urgent attention (e.g., medical, political, or economic). In English the word crisis also generally refers to an

urgent situation that requires quick decision making and resolution. With regard to the Greek economic crisis, there has been no quick resolution or decision making. Instead, political deliberations endure for months and the crisis is now approaching a seven-year period with no definite end in sight. The normative use of the word crisis, then, diminishes the term's urgency instead constructing an existential crisis, one in which crisis persists with no clear beginning or end. According to Cabot (2015) the "proliferation of *crises* is by no means an accident; as others have shown quite convincingly, "crisis" is a cosmology perhaps endemic to neoliberal worlds (Lapavitsas 2014; Lapavitsas and Kouvelakis 2012; Redfield 2005, 2013; Roitman 2014)."

Scholars in various disciplines have begun to critique the notion of crisis and how it informs research questions, political decisions and thus reporting by news organizations (Cabot 2015; Klein 2007). Cabot (2015) writes that:

Crisis-thinking distracts us (see Rakopoulos 2014). Crisis-thinking encourages us to approach such moments as aberrations, exceptions to the normality of social and political orders (see Agamben 2005; Athanasiou 2012). ...Crisis-thinking is also dangerous for how it reifies power relationships and active decisions that lie behind political and economic realities, and for how it presents certain injustices as given and unavoidable when—perhaps—things *really could* be different. Continuities, however, usually are palpably evident in hindsight: for instance, looking back on Hurricane Katrina ten years later, from the viewpoint of the U.S., it is hard not to see the deep forms of class-based and racialized injustice that shaped the outcomes of this "natural" event. It is easy to forget, however, the many who had the foresight to present crucial critiques of these injustices when that particular crisis was unfolding.

Like the Hurricane Katrina "crisis", the Greek economic "crisis" has been reported on by foreign newspapers in such a way that it appears to be an aberration to the social order. The Greek newspapers have categorized events so ubiquitously as simply *crisis* that their coverage reflects the continuity of the events over a much longer period of time. The

data suggest that the Greek newspapers constructed the crisis as status quo, as no longer an aberration, but rather a state of life. By categorizing and describing the Greek economic crisis repeatedly as merely *crisis*, *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia* persistently normalized crisis events as expected and unavoidable within the social and political order. In this way, crisis is constructed as the through line of life. The same events are presented by foreign newspapers as an aberration, and, yet, normalized in the Greek newspapers.

The next two categories, *financial* (23%) and *Greek/national* (17.3%) are diagnostic descriptions of the crisis. These descriptions, used by journalists and guest contributors alike, are factual rather than critical, at least on the surface. They answer the question: *What* is the crisis? They do not address the questions: *Why* is there a crisis? or *How* did this crisis arise? Journalists are expected by Western tradition to provide unbiased reporting of events; however, constructing the news in such a way perpetuates a superficial understanding of world events that disregards the causes of crises. Furthermore, this extends the normalization of crisis across international news. The description of the crisis in diagnostic terms (*Greek/national*, *financial*) may be understood as an unbiased approach, a quick response to reporting newsworthy events, yet the impact of initially constructing the news in such a way is unknown. These categories might indicate the assignation of blame (to Greece) or a cause (finances), but more research is needed to further that discussion.

Three smaller crisis categories (*political*, *systemic/social*, and *capitalist*) suggest that it is possible to address the causes of a crisis even as events are unfolding. However, these categories constitute only 7.6% of the entire sample. While they clearly do not

dominate newspaper coverage, their deviation is important because they depict a construction of events that discusses the causes of crisis as opposed to simply describing crisis.

RQ2: What frames were used by the Greek press to cover the Greek economic crisis and what is their prevalence in the coverage?


Table 3 summarizes the frames that I identified and their prevalence in the coverage of the Greek economic crisis in *Eleftherotypia* and *Kathimerini*. Interestingly, despite the newspapers' political affiliations and the selection of the data around a heightened political event, the two papers framed the news in similar ways. They employed six of the same frames to varying degrees, yet in the same order from most to least prevalent (see Chart 2). In this way the newspapers are quite similar, perhaps echoing each other and contributing to a developing national discourse. In this discussion, greater attention is given to the three most prevalent frames; However, the fact that there are seven identifiable frames in a week's worth of newspaper coverage justifies providing some examples of every frame and discussing the significance of each.

Table 3: Frames Identified in *Eleftherotypia* and *Kathimerini* May 3-9, 2010

Frame	No. of <i>Eleftherotypia</i> Articles with Frame	% of <i>Eleftherotypia</i> Articles with Frame	No. of <i>Kathimerini</i> Articles with Frame	% of <i>Kathimerini</i> Articles with Frame	Total No. of Articles with Frame	Total % of Articles with Frame
The Crisis Will Influence Greek and European Futures	50	39.1%	26	31%	76	35.8%
Anger, Frustration and Fear about Causes of Crisis and Proposed Relief	40	31.3%	22	26.2%	62	29.2%
Political Issues are Exacerbating the Crisis	24	18.8%	11	13.1%	35	16.5%
Crisis Impacts Greek Domestic Life	6	4.7%	11	13.1%	17	8%
Greece Caused the Crisis	3	2.3%	7	8.3%	10	4.7%
Journalists' Reporting is Problematic	5	3.9%	2	2.4%	7	3.3%
Germany's Influence on Greece	0	-	5	6%	5	2.4%
Totals	128	100%	84	100%	212	100%

**CHART 2: FRAMES IDENTIFIED IN
ELEFTHEROTYPIA AND *KATHIMERINI***

- Germany's Influence on Greece
- Journalists' Reporting is Problematic
- Greece Caused the Crisis
- Crisis Impacts Greek Domestic and Home Life
- Political Issues are Exacerbating the Crisis
- Anger, Frustration and Fear about Causes of Crisis and Proposed Relief
- The Crisis Will Influence Greek and European Futures



1. *The Crisis Will Influence Greek and European Futures*

The most prevalent frame across the entire sample was *The Crisis Will Influence Greek and European Futures*. Of the 212 articles, this was the dominant frame in 76 articles, or 35.8% of the sample. This frame appeared more frequently in *Eleftherotypia*, constituting 50 articles or 39.1% of the newspaper's coverage. In *Kathimerini*, it accounted for 26 articles, or 31% of its coverage over the four days analyzed from May 3–9, 2010. Articles using this frame were concerned largely with the future of Greece, the Eurozone, the European Union and how the Greek economic crisis would affect the monetary and political relationships across the European continent. Concern for political, economic and social stability is readily apparent as is a concern that the crisis might spread to other European nations.

This frame is apparent in article titles and main text. Examples of titles are: *In the End, The Country Will Be Reborn* (*Eleftherotypia*, May 3, 2010); *Culture is the Antidote to the Crisis* (*Kathimerini*, May 5, 2010); *Europe's Future Lies in Greece* (*Kathimerini*, May 9, 2010); *Athens Will Destroy the Euro* (*Kathimerini*, May 7, 2010), *Why Do You Need Europe Today?* (*Kathimerini*, May 9, 2010), *Worry About the Spread of the Crisis Intensified* (*Kathimerini*, May 9, 2010), *European Nightmare* (*Eleftherotypia*, May 7, 2010), *From the Eurozone into the New Reich* (*Eleftherotypia*, May 9, 2010), and *Merkel-Sarkozy: Make Us the Saviors of the Euro* (May 7, 2010). The main text of various articles, also clearly demonstrates the *Crisis Will Influence Greek and European Futures* frame. An *Eleftherotypia* May 5, 2010 article, *Angela Merkel: We Were Not Slow to Help Greece*, reports:

Angela Merkel said that she could not agree before the Greek government announces details about the cuts it intends to make. [Merkel said] “That would lead to increased expectations that Eurozone members with large debts could count on generous help without making the same negotiation efforts. Today, Europe is watching us. They are not going to decide without us.”

In similar fashion, in *Kathimerini*’s May 9, 2010 article *Why Do You Need Europe Today?* Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council, contemplates the formation of the European Union and its relevance today, stating:

Step by step, European governments found ways to solve their differences together. The bloodstained battlefields gave way to the negotiation halls of Brussels. This is progress...Today we are a Union of 27 democracies and 500 million citizens, covering the continent from Finland to Portugal and from Ireland to Romania. ...This is not always easy. ... When working for a common purpose, for the benefit of everyone, we must also prepare to face, united, unexpected obstacles. Solidarity means nothing if it only exists when all goes well. Our successful history is not enough to build a common future. Every generation must be convinced all over again that we need the Union.

Feloukatzi (*Eleftherotypia*, May 7, 2010) shared a hopeful viewpoint in his article titled *Agony in Paris for Greece–Euro*. In it he reports that the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stated:

Greece has gone bad, but will recover. We will support it. It is not just the fate of this country, which we all love, but the fate of the common currency and our standard of living for which we advocate. Helping Greece—to avoid its critical derogations—we can continue our European vision.

These examples highlight that, in regard to the crisis, there is both concern and hope for the future of Greece and Europe: concern over tenuous regional stability and hope that Greece and Europe will experience positive social, political and economic transformations as a result of the current circumstances. This frame underscores the official rhetoric of regional solidarity, or a desire for that solidarity to come to fruition, regardless of the unprecedented economic events. The articles in this frame frequently

use European leaders as sources – perhaps indicating a perceived need to support EU solidarity during uncertain times. Through these article titles and text, it is apparent that Greek newspapers were reflecting upon the past, the formation of modern Europe, while also looking to the future with concern for Greece and Europe. The crisis’ epicenter may be in Athens, but Greece’s and Europe’s futures are interdependent.

2. *Anger, Frustration and Fear about the Causes of the Crisis and Proposed Relief*

The second most common frame across the entire sample is *Anger, Frustration and Fear about the Causes of the Crisis and Proposed Relief*. This frame appeared in 62 articles or 29.2% of the sample (26.2% of *Kathimerini* articles and 31.3% of *Eleftherotypia* articles). This frame conveys the anger and frustration of the Greek people, as well as skepticism about the austerity measures and fiscal policies that are supposed to save the economy. This distrust and fear is apparent in article titles such as: *Truth and Lies in the MOU*¹⁴ (*Kathimerini*, May 9, 2010), *The Fall of the City, the Fall of the Country?* (*Kathimerini*, May 9, 2010), *Samaras Says “No” To Agreement With the IMF* (*Kathimerini*, May 5, 2010), *On the Brink* (*Eleftherotypia*, May 3, 2010), *Waiting for the Explosion* (*Eleftherotypia*, May 9, 2010), and *There’s Plenty of Anger...But Logic?* (*Eleftherotypia*, May 7, 2010).

The anger, frustration, and fear captured in this frame are further apparent in the articles’ main text. The following excerpts provide some examples. In Alexis Papahela’s May 9, 2010 *Kathimerini* article, he writes, “I do not think I’ve ever felt so much anxiety, anguish and anger around me. It’s like the world suddenly woke from blissful lethargy

¹⁴ MOU is the acronym for Memorandum of Understanding and refers to the financial bailout agreement signed on May 3, 2010 by George Papandreou on behalf of Greece and by the European Commission on behalf of the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

and indifference, but in a very abrupt and unruly way. ...The anger is incredible and the atmosphere is electrifying.” Margarita Pournara (*Kathimerini*, May 9, 2010) writes about how art may capture the shock and distress of the Greek people, “I believe that Art Athena will capture the numbness that characterizes the Greeks at this time. Even in the gallery, we have perhaps fewer visitors; people feel that they are on the verge of a new era.” In the May 9, 2010 edition of *Eleftherotypia*, Maravegias writes:

Since the time of Aristotle, we know that every tragic catharsis is necessary to satisfy the human sense of justice. In today's tragedy of the Greek economy, the majority of Greek citizens are seeking catharsis, that is to say punishment for those guilty of [creating] the current situation.

In the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the bailout package and new austerity measures, the Greek people flooded the streets with protests for a number of days. On May 5, 2010 the protests turned violent. Two women and one man died after protestors threw petrol bombs, otherwise known as Molotov cocktails, into a bank. A number of journalists captured the outrage from the streets. On May 3, 2010, the day of the protests, Dama (*Eleftherotypia*) reported, “‘Workers, rise up, break the shackles of exploitation. ... No more mockery, no sacrifice for plutocracy’ shouted members of PAME from the megaphone. [They continued] crying ‘Disobedience and Insubordination! Not a single penny for the plutocracy.’” Then, on May 9, 2010, in an article titled, *Who Seeks Blood in the Arena?*, Costopoulos, Trimis, Psarrou, and Psarras (*Eleftherotypia*), write that thousands of protesters from various political parties chanted, “‘We are thousands, we are many and today we’ll take the Parliament.’ From thousands of mouths came spontaneous shouts of ‘thieves-thieves’ and the prompt ‘let [it] burn, let [it] burn, the brothel Parliament.’”

The *Anger, Frustration and Fear about the Causes of the Crisis and Proposed Relief* frame dominates the coverage of the Greek press in the days after the announcement of the first bailout package. From despair to outrage to melancholy, these articles depict a deeply emotional and fearful national response that seemed to grip Greece as the Greek economic crisis continued to unfold. Whereas foreign coverage of the Greek economic crisis portrayed an adversarial Us vs. Them storyline, *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia* depict an introspective, reflective discourse that indicates Greece's self-concern for the nation and its people. In the Greek coverage, the adversarial relationship is not necessarily directed at the EU, but to the "thieves" and "plutocrats" at home who may have brought Greece to the brink of economic and social collapse. This dynamic is further elaborated in the third most prevalent frame, which is discussed next.

3. *Political Issues are Exacerbating the Crisis*

The *Political Issues are Exacerbating the Crisis* frame was the third most prevalent frame across the two newspapers. In this frame journalists and guest contributors discuss the shortcomings of Greek political institutions, both past and present, and how they caused or are exacerbating the crisis. This frame appeared in 35 of the 212 articles, or 16.5% of the sample. It was more common in *Eleftherotypia* with 24 articles (18.8%) than *Kathimerini* which published 11 articles (13.1%) using this frame. This frame is apparent in some headlines as well as the full text of articles. For example, *Eleftherotypia's* articles included the following headlines: *Operation 300 Clean Hands* and *We Live Under a Violent Dictatorship*. Headlines from *Kathimerini* also underscored the political issues; these included: *The Situation in the House Divides Nea Demokratia*

and *Leadership Is Beneath the Circumstances*. These headlines indicate strong criticism of politics, politicians, and journalists.

While some headlines were not so descriptive, the articles' full text developed the *Political Issues are Exacerbating the Crisis* frame. On May 7, 2010, Tziantzi published an article in *Kathimerini* that harshly criticized the over the top theatricality of politicians who frequently appeared on television:

Some politicians attract the interest of the viewer with their style, theatricality and the aggression of their reasons rather than with the content of their words. Only, when the interest has started to fizzle does it give way to discomfort or indignation. ... Many acquaintances and friends tell me that when they see political TV, they change the channel. This, of course, does not exonerate presenters and commentators who can be just as theatrical or aggressive as the political-roosters [calling from their] panels and windows. ... The loser of this obvious decline [in quality] is not politicians but politics itself. ... Many times, after a lengthy and multifaceted political debate, we turn off the TV with the feeling that we have not learned anything, that we just watched a televised show of verbal virtuosity, a low quality show like "Politician's Got Talent" or "Greek (Political) Idol."

This article articulates the ways in which politicians exaggerate issues, creating unnecessary drama that lacks informational substance. Simultaneously, Tziantzi (2010) points to broadcasters and politicians who behave similarly and as a result, the news lacks substance, further obscuring the important political and social issues surrounding the crisis. While this article highlights the interconnectedness of politics and media in the ways that they exacerbate the crisis, the majority of articles in this frame focus on domestic political issues.

Political issues in this frame range from intra-party politics, to the inequities between politicians and the people, to the idea that politically driven decisions have caused much of the present hardship. *Kathimerini* (May 7, 2010) published an article

incorporating General Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece Aleka Papariga's speech and goes as far as to say that the crisis is not monetary, but political in nature:

Ms. Papariga said that the economic crisis is primarily a political rather than an accounting issue, adding that it does not end with the enactment of the bill in parliament, but would be assessed in the coming months by society itself and the mobilizations of workers. "The laws are changing society by creating new majorities," [Papariga] said.

In this example, the crisis is deemed a political issue because it will have long lasting effects on society; effects that can only be realized in time. It underscores the idea that even if the monetary situation was to be remedied, the impact on society will be long term.

A final example from *Eleftherotypia*, provides a critique of the political class which, as a result of its power and privilege, is not affected by the political or monetary consequences of the crisis in the ways that average Greeks are affected. Sokou (May 5, 2010) writes:

The demand for justice is legitimate, but the line between accountability and leveling is usually very thin and one that can easily be exceeded. Typically leveling destroys values, and gives the self-appointed "saviors of the nation" an excuse to develop extreme actions, which in the end returns like a boomerang on citizens and the country itself. The people are being punished while politicians and those that created this situation are not punished. The politics of the past 30 years—crony capitalism—are to blame.

This last excerpt raises the concern that any crisis agreements will impact *to lao* (the populace) more negatively than Greek politicians. This frame helps to illustrate the ways in which the lived experience of Greeks varies by class and social position, something that did not appear in earlier studies. These political concerns seem to echo the *Anger, Frustration and Fear about Causes of Crisis and Proposed Relief* frame. Much like the crisis is described and constructed existentially through constant repetition and

normalization of crisis within the *crisis* category described previously, these two frames illustrate the existential fear of stressful current events. They also depict an ambiguous future that relies greatly on the same political system that Greek newspapers paint as partially responsible for the crisis.

4. *The Crisis Impacts Greek Domestic Life*

The fourth frame that I identified is *The Crisis Impacts Greek Domestic Life*. The 17 articles in this frame (8% of the sample, 4.7% of *Eleftherotypia*'s versus 13.1% of *Kathimerini*'s coverage) address the crisis' impact on local businesses and the daily experience of Greeks. In her May 4, 2010 *Kathimerini* article, *The Crisis is Changing the Retail Map in Greece*, Manifava examines how the crisis will impact grocery stores and the grocer industry in the region. She sees smaller chains and family owned businesses closing and being bought out by large chains that will use Greece to establish a new regional economic base.

Other articles look at the diminishing state of healthcare in Greece. These include *Kathimerini*'s articles, *Suffocation in Nursing Homes* (May 9, 2010), *6.11% Rise in Insurance Purchases* (May 7, 2010) and *Eleftherotypia*'s May 3, 2010 article "*Kallikrates*¹⁵" in *Health Too: The Only Solution*. The first article addresses the dramatically rising cost of elder care coupled with a steep decline in its demand, which leave facilities in danger of being padlocked and deteriorating. The second article, *6.11% Rise in Insurance Purchases*, looks at the rise in demand for private life and auto insurance in the face of economic uncertainty and fear about the ambiguous and uncertain

¹⁵ Kallikrates refers to a legislative bill passed under the PASOK government in 2010 that allowed public services to merge units as a cost-savings measure. This impacted small municipalities as well as state run hospitals (Imerisia.gr, 2011)

future. Finally, the third article about *kallikrates* (programs designed to minimize administration and consolidate state services) describes the shift across healthcare staffing that allows hospitals to move nurses and medical staff across facilities to fill shifts where needed, thereby reducing operating costs. Staffing shortages, shifts in population due to domestic migration, and economic hardship demand new ways of allocating resources to serve citizens' medical needs. This frame illustrates the complex and nuanced ways that the Greek economic crisis is impacting local communities in ways overlooked by the foreign news media.

5. *Greece Caused the Crisis*

The *Greece Caused the Crisis* frame, while very similar to the *Incorrigible Greeks* frame identified in studies of foreign newspaper coverage, constitutes only 4.7% of the sample, which is 10 newspaper articles (2.3% of coverage in *Eleftherotypia* and 8.3% in *Kathimerini*). While the *Incorrigible Greeks* frame dominated studies of the foreign newspaper coverage of the crisis, blaming Greeks was less common within the sample from Greek newspapers. Furthermore, the examples that follow do not depict Greeks as lazy or deceptive, but rather critique nuances of Greek social and political life that have contributed to the crisis circumstances. On May 9, 2010, the former Greek Minister of Finance, Palaiokrassa, wrote the article, *The Post-Feast Season* (*Eleftherotypia*), in which he asserts that, beginning in 2006, Greece should have expected these circumstances, but that the warning signs were ignored during a period of economic "feasting". Giorgio Pagoulatou, associate professor of economics at University of Athens, wrote *View: The Bitter Taste of Defeat* (*Kathimerini*, May 4, 2010), calling for the end of practices like unmarried daughters inheriting their fathers' pensions and argued

for the consolidation of public offices as a means to cut national expenses. He suggests that long-accepted practices and social structures must change for Greece to survive and prosper.

Eleftherotypia also had a number of articles suggesting that Greece is largely to blame for the crisis. On May 9, 2010, Konstantinos Svolopoulos, president of the Academy of Athens, wrote *The Crisis Has Cultural Roots*, and on May 7, 2010, *Eleftherotypia* published an article titled, *Reuters: Crisis is a Greek Word*. Svolopoulos states that Greeks have sacrificed cultural values and created a system with very little power diversity to arrive at the current situation. In this view the crisis is the result of negative cultural transformation. Finally, according to *Eleftherotypia*'s article, Reuters overtly blames Greece for "throwing the first domino" and inciting riots that have stolen the spotlight and scared investors which has exacerbated the crisis. This frame and these examples suggest that if Greeks had behaved differently there might not have been a crisis, or at least not a crisis of this scale.

6. *Journalists' Reporting is Problematic*

The next frame that I identified in the Greek newspaper coverage of the crisis is the *Journalists' Reporting is Problematic* frame, which appeared in seven articles or 3.3% of the coverage. While the volume of articles is small, this frame does echo the concerns of other researchers about the role of the media in constructing and even accelerating the crisis (Juko, 2010; Tracey, 2012). Two examples of this frame from *Kathimerini* are the articles, *Journalists' Shortcomings* (Papahela, May 5, 2010) and *Negative Protagonist on the Front Page of International Media* (*Kathimerini*, May 7, 2010). In *Journalists' Shortcomings* (May 5, 2010), Papahela writes:

Many people are angry with us journalists during these critical hours. It makes sense, because journalism has played a crucial role in [Greece's] post-political system of government, perhaps more crucial than they should have. ... journalism has become, in recent years, a real fourth power, blurring the dividing lines between journalists and politicians.

Often criticized for a long history of politically entangled media, rife with clientelism, Greece, in Papahela's view, has perhaps hit a point where this type of journalism has finally crippled the political and economic systems.

In *Kathimerini's* article, *Negative Protagonist on the Front Page of International Media* (May 7, 2010) and in *Eleftherotypia's* article, *Greece is the First Topic at the Foreign News Agencies* (May 5, 2010), the journalists note the recurring and daily negative coverage of Greece in international news media sources such as *BBC*, *CNN*, *International Herald Tribune*, *La Repubblica*, *El Pais*, *The Guardian*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *The German Financial Times*, *New York Times*, *Hurriyet*, *Xinhua*, *Todays' Zaman*, *Al Jazeera*, *Tagespiegel*, *EFE*, *Associated Press*, *AP*, *Reuters*, and *UPI*. The observations asserted in these articles parallel the findings of other studies of foreign news media coverage and thus indicate that Greece was aware of this "aggressive...negative tone" (*Kathimerini*, May 7, 2010) from the start.

Another *Eleftherotypia* article, *Four Major Upheavals in the Media* (May 3, 2010), is a brief summary of the discussion at the Association of European Journalists meeting on World Press Freedom Day on May 3, 2010. During the event, four shortcomings and challenges to Greek media were directly addressed, including: "the decline of newspapers, the new digital environment, the lack of credibility in the media, and the violation of ethics and the disproportionately [high] number of media in Greece

compared with Europe” (May 3, 2010). Publishing this in a Greek newspaper indicates awareness that the Greek media and press are under scrutiny in Europe.

As mentioned previously, the Greek newspaper and mass media culture have particular characteristics that differ from the Western standard of unbiased, factual reporting. Whether or not this Western standard is attained or attainable is a question for other research. Nonetheless, this frame indicates that, through newspaper reporting, Greece is questioning its newspaper culture, one that is openly political and prone to clientelism. It has also been noted by scholars that Greece holds a geopolitically and culturally amorphous position in the modern world, nestled between Western and Eastern paradigms and seamlessly incorporating aspects of each into its own unique cultural makeup (Gropas, Kouki & Triandafyllidou, 2011; Triandafyllidou & Gropas, 2009). Greek newspapers, of which there are over 50 dailies printed in Athens and Thessaloniki (Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association, 2016), are somewhat unique in their political affiliations. With this in mind, domestic critique of Greek newspapers indicates a demand for changes to national journalism standards or it may underscore ongoing political and cultural power dynamics that are also evident in the foreign newspaper coverage of the Greek economic crisis as discussed previously.

7. Germany's Influence on Greece

The final frame that I identified, constituting 2.4% of the sample, or five articles, is called *Germany's Influence on Greece*. This frame reinforces the antagonistic, power-driven German–Greek relationship that strongly influenced financial agreements between Greece and the Troika. This dynamic also shaped the *Spite* and *Narcissistic* frames in foreign newspaper coverage of the Greek economic crisis. Interestingly, this frame was

only identified in *Kathimerini*, which published the following articles: *Now the Germans Say That They Are Buying Greek Bonds* and *Chancellor Merkel Said Yes to the Contribution* (May 4, 2010), *The German Enigma*, *The Hour of Decision in Europe*, *Yes and No to the Bailout Package*, and *The Hour of Decision in Europe* (May 9, 2010).

In *The Hour of Decision in Europe* (May 9, 2010) Germany's relationship with Greece is characterized as "cruel", "blistering" and "targeting [Greece]" as a way to make an example of it for other European countries to fear. In *Chancellor Merkel Said Yes to the Contribution* (May 4, 2010), Reuters, AFP, and AP are cited as the source and they note that Germany has agreed to the terms of the bailout not only to help Greece, but to stabilize the Euro and therefore strengthen Germany. This article makes clear that these economic and political agreements are certainly not altruistic but a means to increase or assure German power in Europe. Finally, in *Yes and No to the Bailout Package*, Telloglou quotes former German Finance Minister Peter Steinbrück saying, "solidarity with Greece is the best self-protection for...Germans." This comes 15 days after Chancellor Merkel said she "had hoped even to avoid the support of Greece with German taxpayer funds" and "to avoid crashing in local elections." These articles highlight the complicated relationship between two nations of disproportionate political and economic power grappling with the crisis while trying to balance local and regional political demands. This frame also stands in contrast to the *Spite*, *Narcissist*, and *Incorrigible Greeks* frames in the foreign (particularly German) newspaper coverage of the Greek economic crisis that painted Greece as the culpable antagonist—while this frame portrays Greece and Germany as interconnected for better or worse.

When analyzing these data, the impact of episodic versus thematic news framing ought to be considered. My study, by design, examined episodic news coverage. By selecting articles published around key dates the data are selected from discourse produced at moments of high tension and stress in Greece and Europe. As events are unraveling, it may not be possible for newspapers to publish reflective critiques of the political and economic landscape that might answer the questions, Why are we in crisis? and How did this crisis arise? This leads to other areas for future research which should explore the impact of episodic crisis news coverage on long term thematic coverage of events.

In the next section, I examine the crisis descriptors and the news frames for differences and similarities in coverage between the two newspapers, and I discuss how the Greek newspaper coverage of the Greek economic crisis compares with the foreign newspaper coverage of the same events.

RQ3: Given the political nature of Greek newspapers, what similarities and differences exist between Kathimerini and Eleftherotypia – two newspapers that represent different parts of the political spectrum?

Kathimerini and *Eleftherotypia* were selected for this study because they represent different aspects of the political spectrum in Greece. *Kathimerini* is considered a center-right newspaper with ties to Nea Demokratia, a right wing Greek political party that was in political opposition to Greek leadership in May 2010. *Eleftherotypia* was created in the aftermath of the overthrow of a junta in 1974 and has long been a newspaper of left wing political parties in Greece, such as PASOK, which ruled parliament and held the prime ministry in May 2010. Moreover, *Eleftherotypia* is known as the reporters'

newspaper and, as my study reveals, at times it allows contributions from politicians, academics and other thought leaders. During the period from which the sample was drawn, George Papandreou of PASOK was prime minister. When he took office, the state of the Greek economy was revealed to be much worse than previously known. In May 2010, Papandreou agreed to austerity measures that incited protests across Greece. Below, I compare differences between *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia* in the use of crisis naming categories, followed by differences in how the newspapers framed their coverage of events.

Comparing Crisis Naming Categories in Eleftherotypia and Kathimerini

To identify differences I compared the rates at which each newspaper used a particular category. In four crisis naming categories (*financial*, *unprecedented*, *political*, and *capitalist*) there were noticeable differences between the rates at which each newspaper used them. While the rate of use for some categories is low in both papers, in some of these instances one paper uses a category at a rate two to three times greater than the other newspaper. The *financial* category was used in 18.8% of occurrences in *Eleftherotypia* and 29.7% of the occurrences in *Kathimerini*, indicating that *Kathimerini* used the *financial* category one and a half times more often than *Eleftherotypia*. The *unprecedented* category constitutes 6.2% of the sample in *Eleftherotypia* and 2% in *Kathimerini*, meaning *Eleftherotypia* used it three times more than *Kathimerini*. *Kathimerini* used the *political* category 2.0% of the time, while *Eleftherotypia* used it 4.0% of the time, or twice as frequently as *Kathimerini*. Finally, only *Eleftherotypia* used the *capitalist* category and it constituted 1.2% of its sample contribution, appearing four times.

The study's sample is small as are some of these categories. Since the data were collected over a one-week period, noting these small categories is not meant to represent quantitatively statistical significance, but rather to identify trends within each paper over a short period of time. Looking at these differences it is evident that *Kathimerini* categorized the Greek economic crisis more frequently as *financial*. *Eleftherotypia* used the following categories more frequently to name the crisis: *unprecedented*, *political*, and *capitalist*. These differences align with the political leanings of each newspaper as well as the political currents of the time period.

In 2010, right wing Nea Demokratia was the opposition party in the Greek parliament. The party had led the country from 2004-2009 and lost the October 2009 prime minister election to PASOK's Papandreou. Gregoriou (2004) described the Nea Demokratia platform this way:

The [Prime Minister] Karamanlis alternative is clear: speed up the process towards privatization, dismantle the social state, and use scare tactics, xenophobia, nationalism, and scandals to cover Nea Demokratia's neoliberal policies of helping the few at the expense of the many.

By 2010, Nea Demokratia and Karamanlis were blamed for having hidden the declining state of the Greek economy under his leadership. The real size of the debt was realized and announced by Prime Minister Papandreou shortly after his election. By naming the crisis *financial* and thereby as a financial issue, *Kathimerini* contributed to its framing of the crisis as a problem to be solved by treating the immediate issues of budget shortfalls, improving tax collection systems, and reforming financial oversight. Constructing the crisis as financial is a means of discussing the events and issues without investigating underlying social and systemic causes.

Eleftherotypia, on the other hand, categorized the crisis as *unprecedented*, *political*, and *capitalist*. With each of these naming convention categories, the contributors to *Eleftherotypia* construct a discourse about the crisis that challenges foreign newspaper framing of events as well as the more globally dominant discourse perpetuated by *Kathimerini*.

Describing the crisis as *unprecedented*, e.g., serious, great, dire, self-sustaining, acute, huge, multifaceted, abysmal, terrible, grave, and manifold (see Appendix B), *Eleftherotypia* underscores the gravity of the crisis and its effects in Greece, a perspective that is lacking in foreign newspaper coverage of events. In this relatively small portion of the overall sample (20 occurrences in *Eleftherotypia* and 4 occurrences in *Kathimerini*, 4.6% of the sample), the crisis is presented as an aberration. This stands in contrast to the overwhelming normalization of the crisis as indicated by the fact that 41.3% of the sample was categorized as simply crisis. Moreover, left leaning *Eleftherotypia*'s discourse may be a critique of the Nea Demokratia government that was in power leading up to the onset of the Greek economic crisis. The *unprecedented* category is a contradiction to the dominant and normative *crisis* category. The examples in the *unprecedented* category call to attention the abnormality of an international system that spectacularizes and simultaneously downplays the impact of crises on communities and individuals who are not represented by international political organizations like those comprising the Troika.

Eleftherotypia also constructed the crisis as *political* 13 times, compared to *Kathimerini*'s four occurrences. In doing so, *Eleftherotypia* again shows a tendency to look at underlying, root causes of the crisis, rather than describing it in symptomatic

terms. As Tzogopoulos (2014) mentions, Greek politics and journalistic practices are not well understood by other journalists, something he cited as a shortcoming of the foreign newspaper coverage of events. Greek journalists and contributors, such as academics, are singularly positioned to critique national politics and to interrogate their long- and short-term effects on the Greek economic crisis as it unfolds. Describing the crisis as *political* removes the blame from Greek people and culture and, instead, calls into question the ways in which politics influence economic decisions and shape the economic and financial health of a nation.

One crisis naming category, *capitalist*, appeared solely in *Eleftherotypia*. It appeared four times, however this was in four articles by different authors over four days within a seven-day time period. Its appearance in *Eleftherotypia* is in keeping with the newspaper's left, socialist political agenda and echoes the counter narratives described by Douzinas (2010) and Zizek (2010, 2012). By naming the events a "deep capitalist crisis" and an "international capitalist crisis," *Eleftherotypia* is critiquing the dominant political and economic powers in the global community. Neoliberal policies have led international development and economic policies for decades, but economic crisis in Europe gives reason to doubt their efficacy and supposed cure-all benefits for national economies everywhere.

Eleftherotypia and *Kathimerini* categorized the crisis nearly equally as *crisis*, *Greek*, *European/international* and *systemic/social*. The events have been identified as a crisis, perhaps making them newsworthy, creating spectacle in order to attract readership and attention. However, using *crisis* repeatedly may actually lessen its perceived intensity. Today there seems to be a proliferation of crises (migration, refugees,

terrorism, climate change, etc.), perhaps indicating that to be newsworthy something must be a crisis. Equal use of the *Greek* category underscored the idea that physical location, or the seeming epicenter of a crisis, is a way in which crises can be defined and simplified for news coverage. This echoes the existing literature from studies examining foreign newspaper coverage of events. However, it is unclear if Greek newspapers categorized the crisis more or less frequently as Greek than did these other newspapers since the methodologies are not comparable.

Categorizing the crisis as *European/international*, *Eleftherotypia* and *Kathimerini* construct a crisis that can neither be solely blamed on Greece nor remain only a Greek issue. In this view, Greece is European, not simply on the European continent—an issue concerning Greek national identity and European history with which scholars grapple (Gropas et al., 2011). Lastly, the two newspapers categorized the crisis as *systemic/social* at nearly equal rates. This category simultaneously interrogates and comments on the crisis' effects on Greek society—a topic that does not appear in foreign newspapers' framing of these events.

Comparing Frames in Eleftherotypia and Kathimerini

Comparing the framing of the Greek economic crisis in *Eleftherotypia* and *Kathimerini* indicates that each newspaper utilized some frames more than the other. To identify the differences, I compared the rate at which *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia* used each frame. Through this approach I found that *Eleftherotypia* used the *Political Issues are Exacerbating the Crisis* frame more frequently than *Kathimerini*, while *Kathimerini* used the frames *Crisis Impacts Greek Domestic Life* and *Greece Caused the Crisis* more frequently. The newspapers used the two most common frames *Crisis*

Impacts Greek and European Futures and *Anger, Frustration and Fear about Causes of Crisis and Proposed Relief* equally. Two frames, *Journalists' Reporting is Problematic* and *Germany's Influence on Greece* are not discussed in this section because the frequency of use in either paper is minimal, making it impossible to know if there is a difference in their usage.

Eleftherotypia used the *Political Issues are Exacerbating the Crisis* one and a half times more frequently than *Kathimerini*. This frame may be in response to the unexpected financial issues that PASOK's leadership uncovered after Papandreou took office in October 2009. The budget shortfalls existed under the Nea Demokratia government, however they were not made public, and thus the burden of economic reform was inherited by an underprepared PASOK government. The use of this frame is a critique of Greek politicians and underscores Greece's intense political landscape during this time period, as well as the strong connection between political parties and newspapers in Greece.

Three frames, *Crisis Impacts Greek Domestic Life* and *Greece Caused the Crisis* were used more frequently by *Kathimerini* than by *Eleftherotypia*. *Kathimerini* used the *Crisis Impacts Greek Domestic Life* frame nearly three times as frequently as *Eleftherotypia*. The more frequent use of this frame indicates *Kathimerini's* emphasis on financial concerns, markets and economic drivers. The topics of these articles included decreases in gasoline sales, significant drops in e-commerce, supermarkets agreeing to reduce prices in a so-called "gentleman's agreement" and the loss of profitability formerly realized by importers of foreign goods into Greece. These concerns are in line with *Kathimerini's* political and economic views, which are supportive of Nea

Demokratia. Furthermore, they reinforce the notion that, above all else, the crisis is financial as opposed to humanistic.

Kathimerini used the *Greece Caused the Crisis* frame three and a half times more frequently than *Eleftherotypia*. Again this is in line with *Kathimerini*'s center-right political leanings. The frame echoes the dominant foreign newspaper rhetoric, cited in studies discussed previously, that Greeks and Greek culture are the main cause of the crisis. It is reminiscent of "pull yourself up by the bootstraps" rhetoric, whereby Greece created the problem and it ought to have sufficient grit to tackle harsh austerity measures as the means to get the nation back on track with international economic expectations.

Lastly, the two most common frames, *Crisis Impacts Greek and European Futures* and *Skepticism and Anger about Causes of Crisis and Proposed Relief*, were used equally by *Eleftherotypia* and *Kathimerini*. These frames are both forward-looking and signify nationwide concerns about the financial, political and social futures of Greece and Europe. The similar use of these two frames suggests that, despite differences between the two newspapers, there seems to be an emerging national discourse that differs from the foreign news coverage and frames.

RQ4: How do the frames used by the Greek newspapers compare to those used by foreign newspapers to cover the Greek economic crisis?

Comparing the frames used most commonly in *Eleftherotypia* and *Kathimerini* with those frames identified in foreign newspaper coverage reveals some rifts in the discourse regarding how the crisis occurred, who is to blame, and how it ought to be addressed. The first noticeable difference is the foreign newspapers' focus on Greece as "Them," an outsider, versus the Greek newspapers' focus on Greek domestic issues. In

the foreign newspaper frame studies (Antoniades, 2012; Juko, 2010; Mylonas, 2012; Tracy, 2012; Tzogopoulos, 2013) four of the five frames (*culturalist, economic, eschatological* and *spite*) are focused on Greece as the culprit having caused the crisis. Therefore, Greece is expected to accept responsibility and suffer the consequences of the economic solutions. The *eschatological* frame does include a focus on the entire EU and the global economy, but it can be conceived of as a frame that identifies the need to contain the crisis in Greece so that it remains an external issue. The *narcissistic* frame, identified in German newspapers, is the exception in the foreign coverage. It is the only frame not focused on Greece and, instead, it reflects the impact of the crisis on Germany and on German people, though it also depicts Greece in a negative light.

In contrast, the Greek newspapers cover the Greek economic crisis primarily using frames that are domestically focused, addressing the immediate concerns of the Greek people and society. These frames (*Anger, Frustration and Fear about Causes of Crisis and Proposed Relief, Political Issues are Exacerbating the Crisis, Crisis Impacts Greek Domestic Life*) which account for 53.7% of the Greek newspaper articles are examples of domestically focused rhetoric. Despite widespread coverage of the Greek economic crisis by foreign newspapers, poignant stories and concerns from within Greece were not shared across global news outlets. The anger, frustration, and fears that were captured by Greek newspapers humanize the crisis and stand in stark contrast to the objectification and alienation of Greece by foreign newspapers. The story of the Greek economic crisis in the Greek newspapers provides a more humanistic glimpse of life in Greece which varies greatly from the foreign press' discourse about power, international finance and politics. The domestically focused Greek frames illustrate the lived

experience of Greeks—concerns about elder care, access to personal loans, grocery store closures, fear and anxiety about the future, and complicated domestic political issues—topics that do not appear in earlier studies of foreign newspaper coverage.

The one exception is the *Crisis Will Influence Greek & European Futures* frame, which examines Greek and European issues. In ways similar to the *eschatological* frame, the articles using this frame address the impact of the crisis outside of Greece. However, rather than focusing on containing the crisis or slowing its spread, the Greek newspaper coverage presents the idea that the crisis will inevitably impact the EU. The concern is not solely with stopping the crisis, but with how policies and economies will shift within this politically and economically united region. The core difference between these two prevalent frames is that foreign news coverage implies that Greece can be separated from the EU, an Us vs. Them notion, while framing in Greek newspapers reflects an integrated conception of the EU. Another way of understanding the outward focus of the Greek newspaper frame, *Crisis Will Influence Greek & European Futures*, is that it reflects Greek, political rhetoric that seeks to remind the EU, and reinforce for Greece, that their futures are integrated and that Greece cannot be excluded or quarantined from the rest of Europe.

Another difference between the frames used by international and Greek newspapers is the juxtaposition of Greece vs. Germany. Overall, foreign newspapers frequently employed the Us vs. Them convention, labeling Greece as an irresponsible and unruly member of the EU. This is particularly noticeable in the *culturalist*, *narcissistic* and *spite* frames, and also woven into the *eschatological* and *economic* frames. In contrast, only *Kathimerini* overtly framed the crisis as a German issue in a mere five

articles. The frame, *Germany's Influence on Greece*, does not construct Germany as an enemy or even an antagonist, but instead as having significant power in the evolution of the political and economic events and resolutions. Germany's power in the international arena, particularly as concerns Greece's financial and political future, may be one reason that the Greek newspapers do not employ the Greece vs. Germany convention.

Additionally, Greek newspapers were focused on the domestic impacts of the crisis that affected day-to-day life in Greece as well as implications for Greece's future within the EU.

Conversely, in foreign newspapers, Germany dominates the relationship between Greece and the rest of Europe. Germany is in a powerful position to both aid and criticize Greece, as was apparent in the framing of foreign coverage of the Greek economic crisis. This is an example of the connection between political power and news reporting and thus the construction of events and history via newspapers. German newspapers (Mylonas 2012) in particular framed the Greek economic crisis such that Germany was constructed as an overly generous patron providing support to Greece without any reciprocal benefit. Similar frames were found in other studies that examined foreign newspaper coverage of the Greek economic crisis. In this case, Germany has wielded considerable power and influence over the outcome of financial agreements between Greece and European entities. For example, on March 25, 2010 Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that she would "urge European Union leaders to agree that International Monetary Fund (IMF) and bilateral European aid could be used as a 'last resort' for Greece if it reached the brink of insolvency" (EurActiv.com). Rhetoric such as this was republished in many news sources, including those studied by

researchers (Antoniades, 2012; Juko, 2010; Mylonas, 2012; Tracy, 2012; Tzogopoulos, 2013). This supports the idea that a politically powerful and linguistically accessible nation's discourse has greater impact on the reporting of international events and thus bears greater significance in the rhetorical construction of historical events.

Chapter Seven: Limitations, Questions for Future Research and Conclusions

Limitations and Contributions of This Study

By examining news coverage in the Greek press, this study aims to contribute a new perspective on how the Greek economic crisis was constructed by foreign and Greek newspapers. However, the study has some limitations that must be acknowledged. First, compared to the quantitative portion of some frame studies (Antoniades, 2013; Tzogopoulos, 2013; Papathanassopoulos, 2014), my sample size is relatively small. It could be argued that this smaller sample size increases the possibility of missing some perspectives. Nevertheless, it was necessary to limit the scope of data for this study due to the time intensity of using an inductive approach, which requires reading and coding entire articles, rather than just headlines and leads. By using this qualitative, purposive approach I was able to analyze the data in a deeper and more nuanced way which leads to findings that could be missed if using other methods. The results of this qualitative study, informed by my cultural knowledge of and experience in Greece, are a unique addition to the exiting literature of frame studies and the Greek economic crisis. Finally, as a solo researcher, my study's findings will be partial and subjective. However, conducting the research in a reflexive way should contribute to the validity of my interpretations.

Questions for Future Research

This study, which contributes new perspectives on the Greek economic crisis by examining its construction in Greek newspapers, also points to new directions for future research about the framing of international news and events. One avenue for future research is to explore the cultures in which news is created and reported. Greece's dozens of newspapers are recognized as having strong political affiliations and a long history of clientelism. News reports are openly and highly political and newspapers allow contributions from a wide range of voices including academics, politicians, and average citizens, at least on the websites of major newspapers such as *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotypia*. In this case study, the perceived flaws of the Greek media may have aided in the construction of a discourse that varies greatly from the dominant foreign construction of the Greek economic crisis. Contributions from non-journalists and politicized discourse led to the publication of a diversity of frames and perspectives on the events of May 2010, a diversity that was not identified in earlier studies of foreign newspaper coverage of the Greek economic crisis.

The study clearly proves that Greek coverage provided very different perspectives about the Greek economic crisis than did foreign newspapers. With this in mind, researcher and journalists ought to more reflexively consider the important role they play in constructing news and knowledge. They choose which stories and sources to include in writing and research and these choices clearly impact their results—results that impact international discourse and understanding. Journalists and researchers must consider the benefits of including underrepresented sources such as local people and newspapers that diversify and complicate the discourse by exposing alternative perspectives. In a speech

at University of Denver, Lourdes Garcia-Navarro of NPR stated: “I always look for English speakers [to interview] and I am so happy when I find them” (April 15, 2016). Her comment highlights journalists’ all too common reliance on easily accessible sources rather than the most valid, influential or informative sources to construct news reports. Including local, relevant sources might be challenging, but it could powerfully shift the way in which news is told and discourse is constructed by newspapers and the news media. Doing so might also counteract the power and dominance of news stories emanating from large corporate agencies such as Reuters and the Associated Press. Finally, rather than focusing on the perceived flaws of Greece’s politicized newspapers, more effort ought to be made, particularly in research, to include a myriad of perspectives outside of the most powerful or linguistically accessible foreign newspapers. The challenge for future research on the Greek economic crisis, or any event of international significance, is to include data from sources that are less economically and politically powerful, yet able to provide a unique cultural or historic perspective that might otherwise be lost.

A second direction for future research is to conduct a longitudinal study of the framing of the Greek economic crisis by Greek newspapers. By examining articles from a week-long period in May 2010, the study relies on episodic framing of the events surrounding the first economic bailout package offered to and accepted by Greece. The Greek economic crisis, which is now arguably in its seventh year, including three bailout packages, could be a rich case study for the evolution of international news coverage and framing over a longer period of time. A future study that continues to compare Greek newspaper articles with newspaper articles from other powerful, non-Greek sources

would provide insights into the way news evolves in relation to differences of economic and political power as well as populist concerns.

A third direction for future research is to explore the role of “crisis” in selecting and creating newsworthy events. While the word crisis was the only keyword used in identifying articles to include in this data sample, it is notable that over 40% of the occurrences of the word crisis throughout the sample were simply as *crisis*, without any modifiers. It seems that news coverage increasingly focuses on crises including economic, housing, refugee, humanitarian, terrorist and natural crises. Studies that examine the volume of news coverage that is framed as “crisis news” would complement recent research on individual preferences for negatively framed news (Trussler & Soroka 2014). Additional questions might include how reporters select and supply crisis news and what other factors influence news selection and publication. Finally, studies of the historic progression of crisis news coverage, particularly the volume of crisis news coverage, might reveal changes in news selection and framing over longer time periods.

Conclusion

The findings of this study bring to light a number of considerations regarding the ways in which news events are reported, the construction of the Greek economic crisis in particular, and the power and fallibility of globalized news media, while foreshadowing the current state of Greek and European political and economic dynamics.

First, the findings of this study illustrate a Greek perspective on the Greek economic crisis, which is domestic, national news, as opposed to foreign news as reported by foreign newspapers. While studies of the foreign newspapers reviewed for this study strongly indicate a bias against Greeks and overt blaming of Greek culture for causing the

crisis, Greek newspapers present a very different, humanistic story about the difficulties Greeks face in day-to-day life. The frame, *Politics are Exacerbating the Crisis*, reveals a perspective wherein Greeks are victims of the crisis and their political system and politicians rather than instigators of the crisis. This perspective does not appear in the earlier studies, which calls into question the limitations of a globalized news system to include multiple perspectives in coverage of complex international events. In this case, the issues affecting Greece quickly became international news with global implications. In the process of storytelling, the foreign newspapers failed to include the perspective of those people most immediately affected by the failing economy and proposed bailout agreement—to *laos*, the average people living in Greece.

The findings of this study problematize the ability of a globalized news media system to accurately and completely report international events. Undoubtedly, advances in technology and a globalized world mean that individuals today have more access to the internet and, therefore, to international news than ever before (Internet Society 2015). Yet, despite the fact that access is at an all-time high and continues to increase, our globalized news media system may simply be replicating the powerful hegemony of news and information on a grander scale, rather than diversifying perspectives. As we see from this case study, 34 foreign newspapers replicated a small number of frames in their coverage of the Greek economic crisis, and neoliberal restructuring of the debt and new borrowing were suggested as the sole means to rectify the crisis. The dominant discourse prevailed internationally, so access to knowledge and information does not neutralize the impact of political and economic power on the rhetorical construction of international events.

Rather than increasing our knowledge of world news and events, newspapers may limit multiple perspectives, intentionally or unintentionally, by excluding news coverage from key constituents and replicating or propagating the same story across numerous outlets. The belief that globalization and the internet foster better information about global events, undermines the reality that more powerful countries, media agencies, or, in this case, newspapers can use that power to set the global reporting agenda, and in doing so construct current events through a particular, less than diverse, lens. This does not negate an individual's agency in seeking out alternative news sources and perspectives, yet, in the case of the Greek economic crisis, accessing the Greek perspective requires the ability to identify and read Greek newspapers. This indirectly highlights the hegemony of English, which along with a handful of other languages, has the power to construct a limited international discourse on a variety of global issues.

This case study problematizes the construction of news and international events by foreign national and international newspapers. It seems that foreign national and international newspapers do not necessarily create diverse discourse; rather, dominant narratives persist and are repeated, increasing their transnational potency. The persistence and amplification of some narratives thus structures news and knowledge of global events for vast international audiences. While some narratives gain power, others are marginalized through political and economic power differentials and through linguistic and technological accessibility.

The fact that foreign newspapers provided limited perspectives on the Greek economic crisis leads to professional implications for journalists working on complex international news. First, journalists are commonly expected to report unbiased news and

facts; however, they are subject to the editorial influence and the political agendas of media owners. Secondly, in reporting on political issues, speeches and events, there is a clearly a need for foreign reporters to collaborate with local reporters (Tzogopoulos 2013) and to think critically about what new or untapped perspectives they could be pursuing and sharing to diversify the coverage of an event. Tzogopoulos (2013) specifically critiqued international journalists for flying into Athens, yet not collaborating with Greek journalists who could have shared local perspectives, national history, story context, or leads to other meaningful interviews that could have been shared on the international stage. While parachute journalism is not a new concept, this study powerfully reveals that there is still significant progress to be made in global journalism.

Finally, the divergence between the framing the of the Greek economic crisis in international and Greek newspapers can, today, be understood as foreshadowing the *Oxi* (No) vote on a third bailout referendum that took place on July 5, 2015. In an unprecedented move, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras announced the first ever referendum on national financial policy on June 27, 2015. The demonstrations leading up to the July 5, 2015 vote and the defeat of the referendum by Greeks, a decision that was said to threaten their membership and participation in European systems and politics, is not surprising given the level of social unrest in Greece. As my findings indicate, Greeks were angry and frustrated by their unraveling economy in 2010 and, in the years following, little has been done to ameliorate the Greek economy and way of life. Instead they have been in steady decline leading many in Greece to live in a precarious balance that has given rise to new community associations and support systems. The events in Greece surrounding the 2015 referendum vote grew out of mounting tension and social

unrest that has been continuously neglected by foreign newspapers. The failure of foreign newspapers to include the Greek perspective may have increased the level of spectacularization surrounding more recent Greek economic crisis events such as the July 2015 “*Oxi*” vote. As the Greek domestic perspective had been overlooked in the coverage of foreign newspapers, these stories may seem extraordinary to those unfamiliar with the impact of the Greek economic crisis and the ensuing bailout packages on Greece. However, tension within Greece regarding the ongoing Greek economic crisis has continued to mount over the past seven years.

The findings of this study underscore the power that newspapers have to construct knowledge about global events and, in doing so, to shape history. Analyzing the ways in which Greek newspapers framed and constructed the Greek economic crisis reveals numerous counter narratives that complement the international frames by providing unexplored perspectives on the impact of the crisis on those living in Greece. Moreover the findings underscore the hegemony of information created by those entities with the most political, economic and linguistic power. The need for journalists to collaborate more widely with local professionals on matters of international import is undoubtedly clear. Finally, this study is a reminder to those involved in journalistic and media research to continue to think critically about missing perspectives and to question how their absence shapes international discourse about global events.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Greek Economic Crisis Timeline, October 2009-February 2016

October 18, 2009	The new Greek government, led by Prime Minister Papandreou of PASOK, announced that the Greek national debt is estimated to be 12.7%, much higher the 3.7% that was previously reported to the EU by Prime Minister Karamanlis of Nea Demokratia
December 8, 2009	Greece's credit rating was downgraded Fitch from A- to BBB+. By Spring, Greece could not borrow money and was shut out of markets even though it previously borrowed at rates like Germany's.
January 2010	Eurostat issued a report accusing Greece and its politicians of falsifying data and interfering with reporting
February 9, 2010	First austerity package implemented freezing government employee salaries, 10% cut in bonuses, overtime workers, public employees and work-related travel
March 5, 2010	Greece announced second austerity package of its own volition, increasing the VAT, cigarette and alcohol taxes, while freezing pensions and capping civil servants' pay.
March 26, 2010	Germany's Chancellor Merkel agreed that a "last resort" rescue package should be worked out for Greece.
April 2010	The previously reported 2009 Greek budget deficit of 12.7% was increased to 13.6%.
April 23, 2010	Greece requested a bailout package of €45 billion from the EU and IMF to cover Greek financial needs through 2010.
April 27, 2010	Standard & Poor's downgraded Greece's sovereign debt rating to BB+.
May 1, 2010	Greece announced austerity measures to encourage Germany's support of an EU and IMF bailout package.
May 2, 2010	The Eurozone and IMF agreed to a three-year, €110 billion loan to Greece and Greece agreed to €30 billion in budget cuts.
May 4-5, 2010	Greeks, angered by austerity measures, hold a national strike in addition to ongoing riots and protests. Three people died in a bank fire.
May 6, 2010	Greek parliament passes the third austerity package to save €38 billion. Cuts to pensions, income, bonuses, increase women's retirement age from 60 to 65, increase sales, VAT and taxes.

Appendix A: Greek Economic Crisis Timeline, cont.

May 10, 2010	Global safety net worth \$1 trillion is implemented to bolster financial markets and prevent the Greek crisis from damaging the Euro.
November 2010	Eurostat report revealed that 2009 figures for Greece were €299.7billion and a deficit of 15.7% of GDP.
April 23, 2011	European commission stated that the Greek budget was worse than expected; The second crisis begins.
June 8, 2011	EU and IMF audit called for additional austerity measures to which Greece agreed.
June 13, 2011	Standard & Poor's further downgraded Greece from a B to a CCC rating.
June 17, 2011	Prime Minister Papandreou appointed a PASOK party rival, Evangelos Venizelos of Nea Demokratia, as new finance minister.
June 22, 2011	Greek cabinet won vote of confidence.
June 29, 2011	Greek parliament passes fourth austerity package increasing tax on those making over €8,000 annually, new tax on those making more than €12,000 annually, increase VAT tax on housing, further reduce pension payments an additional 2%-4%.
July 3, 2011	European finance minister postponed a decision regarding the second bailout.
July 21, 2011	Euro zone leaders consented to second bailout package worth an extra €109 billion, money Greece needed to avoid default in March 2012.
October 2, 2011	Greek draft budget predicted an 8.5% deficit for 2011, missing the target set by international lenders. Athens blamed a deeper recession than anticipated.
October 21, 2011	Greece approved fifth austerity package, despite violent protests and general strikes in Athens. Uniform pay scale for civil servants, cap on wages and bonuses. Tax-free threshold reduced to €5,000, monthly pensions above €1,200 are cut 20%, schools closed or merged to reduce education spending.
October 27, 2011	Euro zone leaders increased bailout package to €130 billion from €109 billion.
October 31, 2011	Papandreou called a national referendum on the bailout package without prior approval from European leaders.
November 4, 2011	Greek government dropped the plan for a referendum vote as a result of intense pressure from European leaders.
November 5, 2011	Prime Minister Papandreou won parliamentary confidence vote.
November 6, 2011	Papandreou made a deal creating a coalition that would approve the bailout and consented to resign three days later.

Appendix A: Greek Economic Crisis Timeline, cont.

November 10, 2011	Lucas Papademos, former European Central Bank vice-president was appointed head of the new coalition government.
November 24, 2011	Antonis Samaras, leader of the Nea Demokratia party and a member of the new coalition government, sent a written pledge backing the bailout to IMF leaders.
December 6, 2011	Protests outside parliament in Athens lead to violence; 38 people were arrested and some protestors were wounded.
December 7, 2011	Coalition government passed an austerity budget for 2012 designed to reduce the Greek deficit to 5.4%.
December 14, 2011	IMF announced that reforms are behind schedule and that political delays were stalling recovery.
February 6, 2012	Germany's Chancellor Merkel urged Greece to accept the terms of the second EU/IMF bailout plan.
February 9, 2012	A deal for the second bailout was reached; Greece's labor unions called for a 48-hour strike.
February 12, 2012	Greek parliament endorsed sixth austerity package; thousands protested in Athens leading to fires and conflicts with riot police. 22% cut to minimum wage reducing it to €585 monthly, holiday bonuses cancelled, pension cuts worth €300 million, laws changed making it easier to lay off workers, cuts to health and defense spending.
February 21, 2012	Eurozone ministers in Brussels agreed to €130 billion bailout and measures to reduce Greece's debt to 120.5% of GDP by 2020.
March 9, 2012	A bond swap was worked out with Greek creditors that eliminated 100Bn Euro of Greek debt. To do this, the banks eliminated 75% of the value of their loans to Greece.
May 6, 2012	Nea Demokratia wins elections, but with a smaller share of the popular vote and fewer seats than it had in the previous election. The governing PASOK party collapses, while more votes go to the left wing parties (SYRIZA, KKE, and DIMAR) and right wing parties (ANEL, XA). No party wins the majority of the parliament seats.
May 25, 2012	The Athens Stock Exchange general index falls below 500 points.
May 16, 2012	No coalition government is able to be formed, so Panagiotis Pikramenos assumes the position of caretaker Prime Minister. An early election is called for June 17, 2012.
June 17, 2012	Nea Demokratia wins 29.7% of the popular vote, but not a majority. Coalition is formed between New Democracy, PASOK and DIMAR, Samaras, becomes the Prime Minister.

<i>Appendix A: Greek Economic Crisis Timeline, cont.</i>	
November 7, 2012	The Seventh austerity package is adopted by the Greek parliament. The austerity measures are required for Greece to receive the next installment of the second economic bailout, worth €31.5 billion. Protests occur outside the parliament.
April 28, 2013	Greece passes first part of eighth austerity package which included mass public sector layoffs and increasing teachers work hours.
June 11, 2013	Greek parliament closes Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorasi (ERT) or the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation.
June 21, 2013	The Democratic Left party (DIMAR) withdraws its leadership from the Greek coalition government, which retains a razor-thin majority in parliament.
July 17, 2013	The second part of the eighth austerity package is passed including thousands of layoffs (high school teachers, school guards, and municipal police) and wage cuts for civil service workers.
July 18, 2013	General ban on demonstrations is enacted and 4,000 police officers are mobilized to minimize protests during German minister of finance Wolfgang Schauble's visit.
August 29, 2013	New public broadcaster, EDT, is launched
November 30, 2013	Moody's upgrades Greece credit rating to Caa3 from C.
December 8, 2013	2014 budget is passed anticipating growth which is seen as a sign of the crisis nearing an end
January 14, 2014	Greece announces a budget surplus of 1.5% of GDP for 2013.
February 2014	Greek unemployment hits 28%, an all-time high
April 2014	Greece raises €4 billion in world financial markets through sale of long-term government bonds.
May 9, 2014	Ninth austerity package passed. It freezes wages and pensions for four years and cut Ministry of Health expense budget.
May 23, 2014	Fitch upgrades Greece's credit rating to B from B-.
May 25, 2014	SYRIZA, a radical left, anti-austerity party wins the European parliament elections in Greece.
December 9, 2014	Athens Stock Exchange drops 12.78%, its largest decline in nearly 25 years.
January 25-26, 2015	SYRIZA wins Greek legislative election and becomes majority party in parliament. Alexis Tsipras becomes Prime Minister

Appendix A: Greek Economic Crisis Timeline, cont.

February 20, 2015	The Eurogroup brokers an agreement between Greece and the Eurozone for a four-month loan extension. Greece undertakes a Eurozone approved reform program.
June 4, 2015	Greece asks IMF for extension to make payment due June 5, 2015.
June 25, 2015	Prime Minister Tsipras announces a referendum on a bailout agreement, to be held on 5 July 2015.
June 28, 2015	Tsipras announces Greek banks will close indefinitely and limits ATM withdrawals to (€60/day.
June 30, 2015	Greece misses payment to IMF.
July 5, 2015	The Greek bailout referendum, or Oxi vote, is held and 61% of Greeks vote no against the proposed measures.
July 11-13, 2015	Greek parliament approves the government proposed (€86 billion bailout plan and it is approved by European creditors.
July 16, 2015	Tenth austerity package passed. Increased retirement to 67 in 2022, eliminate VAT tax advantages for touristic islands, increase corporate taxes, increase luxury tax, increase pensioner contribution to healthcare from 4% to 6%.
July 20, 2015	Greek banks open, but capital controls remain in place.
August 20, 2015	Prime minister Alexis Tsipras resigns and declares new elections to take place September 20, 2015.
August 3, 2015	Greek Stock Exchange opens after being closed since June 25, 2015.
August 14, 2015	Greek parliament approves eleventh set of austerity measures. News taxes on farmers, diesel fuels, private schools, freelance workers. Reduced VAT tax for islands to be abolished by the end of 2016.
September 20, 2015	SYRIZA wins parliamentary elections and Alexis Tsipras is once again made Prime Minister.
November 19, 2015	Greek parliament passes a twelfth austerity package including new taxes on gambling and Greek wine. Debtors who default on loans will lose homes, with protection only for the 25% of debtors who are most marginalized.
January -February, 2016	Farmers across Greece hold strikes in villages, and major cities such as Athens to protest the most recent measures impacting pensions, property and new taxes on farmers.
January 22, 2016	Standard and Poor's improves Greece's credit rating to a B-.
February 8, 2016	The Athens Stock Exchange falls below 500 units for the second time in three and a half years.

Appendix B: Complete List of Crisis Naming Conventions

Crisis Category	Descriptors used in <i>Kathimerini</i>	Descriptors used in <i>Eleftherotypia</i>
Crisis	latest crisis, current crisis, a crisis, a similar crisis, crisis, every crisis, the crisis, this crisis, crisis management	current crisis, recent crisis, another such crisis, crisis, a crisis, what crisis, each crisis, in crisis, from crisis to crisis, time of crisis, this crisis, the crisis, one crisis after another, post-crisis development phase, pre-crisis levels, crisis management, crisis resolution, crisis-management group
Financial	economic and financial crisis, economic crisis, financial crisis, debt crisis, financial and productive crisis, fiscal ¹⁶ crisis, lending crisis	economic crisis, financial crisis, debt crisis, monetary crisis, borrowing crisis, economic and financial crisis, crisis of the Greek debt, fiscal crisis
Greek/National	crisis in the Greek economy, Greece's crisis, Greek crisis, national crisis, our crisis, our own crisis, sovereign crisis, crisis in Greece	crisis in Greece, Greek crisis, crisis of the Greek debt, Greek problem, crisis is a Greek word, our country's crisis, Greek tragedy, times of great national crisis, global crisis has affected Greece, Greek financial crisis, Greek economic crisis, Greek debt crisis

¹⁶ Fiscal crisis appears in two categories: Financial and Political. In Greek, the word δημοσιονομική (dimosionomiki) can be translated as either financial or fiscal, the latter of which can be defined as having to do with tax revenue and a government's political financial obligations. These individual naming convention occurrences were inductively coded in accordance with the overall theme of the article in which they appeared and categorized appropriately.

Appendix B: Complete List of Crisis Naming Conventions, cont.

Crisis Category	Descriptors used in <i>Kathimerini</i>	Descriptors used in <i>Eleftherotypia</i>
European/International	global crisis, crisis of the Euro, crisis in the Eurozone, European crisis	global crisis, international crisis, Euro crisis, economic crisis of Europe, global crisis, Eurozone crisis, European crisis, crisis in Europe, current Euro crisis, from crisis to crisis Europe progresses, European debt crisis, debt crisis in Europe
Political	political crisis, fiscal crisis	political crisis, fiscal crisis, government in crisis, legitimacy crisis, post-politician, political crisis, credibility crisis, legitimization crisis, inner-party crisis
Unprecedented	unprecedented crisis, this terrible crisis	first serious crisis, great crisis, unprecedented crisis, dire crisis, self-sustaining crisis, acute crisis, huge crisis, multifaceted crisis, abysmal crisis, terrible crisis, grave crisis, manifold crisis
Systemic/Social	social and moral crisis, deeper and structural crisis, crisis of institutions and values, deep crisis, limit and structural crisis, social crisis, crisis of society	deep crisis, deepest crisis, systemic crisis, transmission crisis, social crisis, general crisis of civilization, the general crisis
Capitalist	n/a	crisis of the parties serving the capitalist systems, [SYRIZA and the Communist Party] invest in crisis, deepest capitalist crisis, international capitalist crisis